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Abstract

There are many types of models for counterterrorism, explaining different
problems that the military faces in the fight against terrorism. This thesis proposes that
one of the fundamental assumptions underlying existing models of counterterrorism is
that the struggle with terrorists can be understood as a war in the traditional sense of the
term. We propose to rethink the struggle against terrorism as a fight against an infection.
The epidemic of terrorist ideology within part of the world is a result, from this
perspective, of the infectiousness of that ideology. Using the insights of the field of the
epidemiology of ideas, this research looks into the models and methods used to
understand and fight biological epidemics. We work with the SIR model from
mathematical epidemiology, which partitions populations into susceptible, infected, and
recovered categories, and apply that model with notional starting rates to the epidemic of
terrorist ideology. This research allows another set of assumptions for models used in
counterterrorism because the insights gained from viewing terrorism as a symptom of an
epidemic can expand our understanding of the problem that we fight.
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An Epidemiological Approach to Terrorism
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background

The problem of terrorism and how to best fight it has become a central question
for the American military. There are large numbers of papers and books that examine the
sources of terrorism and how things have gotten to the point that they have with the
Global War on Terror. Every group of researchers takes their particular slant to
considering how best to approach this fight, and they have developed a lot of specific
systems and models, all with the intent to somehow help along the fight that the United
States is engaged in against transnational terrorist groups.
Within the operational research arena, many models exist that purport to allocate
resources, develop strategies, and otherwise solve problems that plague the war on terror.
These models engage diverse problem-solving approaches, from linear programming to
simulations, but all of them seem to rely on certain fundamental presuppositions about
the nature of the fight against terrorism. Even the terminology of the title of the struggle,
the Global War on Terror, highlights the underpinning assumption that the United States
is engaged in a struggle with terrorists that can be understood as a war.
War is defined as “a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict
between states or nations . . . the art or science of warfare . . . a state of hostility, conflict,
or antagonism . . . [or] a struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a
particular end” by the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (http://www.m1

w.com/dictionary/war). The United States military has evolved many different strategies
and doctrines that allow it to fight in wars—these have changed over time, related often
to the particular conflicts that the American military has been involved in. One of the
most strongly influential military philosophers who has influenced Western definitions of
war was Carl von Clausewitz. His theory has been invoked, especially since the Vietnam
War, as the call to principled, decisive, and rational action in warfare. (Fleming, 2004:
62-63)
Following the philosophical trail blazed by Clausewitz, much of Western thought
has centered around the idea that within conflicts, rational objectives are desired on both
sides and rational actions stem from those objectives. Because of this, many models of
conflict have been created that include game theory and its assumptions of rational action
on the part of both “players” in a conflict. However, reason is a hallmark of Western
thought, and not something that is universally admired or sought after in other cultures.
The fundamentalist Muslim would likely see studied rational self-preserving action, in
warfare, as being something intrinsically antithetical to his or her values.
Western thought about war and the optimal strategies in which to fight war tend to
concentrate on optimizing the effects of one side’s weapons strikes on the other side. To
this end, much inquiry has been made into centers of gravity, the idea that one can
maximize the harm to the other side by choosing one’s targets for their strategic and
economic value to the other side in the conflict. The assumption is that, once one side
experiences enough loss of manpower and infrastructure, that side will have no other
option but to surrender and end the conflict. This underlying assumption also contributes
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to models of rational decision-making in game theory. However, these assumptions that
people operate in a purely rational manner is fundamentally Western in nature. The
actions of terrorists and other such “fanatics” tend to defy rational explanation—in no
game-theoretic model would the behavior of a suicide bomber maximize the expected
payoff for that bomber.
In the article “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology”, author Lee Harris describes the
tendency of Americans to see the struggle against terrorists as a traditional war as
follows:
“This common identification of 9-11 as an act of war arises from a deeper
unquestioned assumption. . . . The assumption is this: An act of violence on the
magnitude of 9-11 can only have been intended to further some kind of political
objective. What this political objective might be, or whether it is worthwhile—
these are all secondary considerations; but surely people do not commit such acts
unless they are trying to achieve some kind of recognizably political purpose.
“Behind this shared assumption stands the figure of Clausewitz and his
famous definition of war as politics carried out by other means. The whole point
of war, on this reading, is to get other people to do what we want them to do: It is
an effort to make others adopt our policies and/or to further our interests.
Clausewitzian war, in short, is rational and instrumental. It is the attempt to bring
about a new state of affairs through the artful combination of violence and the
promise to cease violence if certain political objectives are met.” (Harris, 2002: 2)

3

The military understanding of the word “war” carries with it expectations of a
defined struggle with opponents who have a clear objective—to do harm to us. We
approach our problem solving, then, with the expectation that our opponents, the
terrorists, have the Clausewitzian goal of maximizing the damage that they can do to
American interests both overseas and here in the homeland. The problem with this
assumption—which is evident in most of the models of counterterrorist applications—is
that it has not been supported by the actions of terrorists. Terrorists and their greater
transnational networks have not behaved in a manner that one could predict with a
Clausewitzian understanding of the nature of the opponent.
Recent analyses of terrorist actions, particularly the troublesome transnational
Islamist terrorist groups, have highlighted this fact. Even though they have the resources
to strike us, and the clear example of ways to maximize panic and chaos through the
American public, these groups have not chosen to do so. As much time and resources
have been put into the problem of divesting terrorist groups of training facilities, recruits,
weapons and monetary resources, it has been a difficult problem to cut these resources
off entirely. Some groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah have turned to South American
drug trafficking in order to fund their groups, and other transnational terrorist groups
have likely done the same. Countries such as North Korea and China, traditionally
antagonistic to the Western world and the United States in particular, have shown no
compunction about trading in weapons with this area of the world, leading to an
understanding that the groups who want these resources have the ability to obtain them.
Thus it would be foolish to underestimate the resources at the hands of the terrorist
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groups—but one would expect, if these groups were seeking to maximize damage and
chaos, that they would have leveraged these resources against the United States in a way
that we have not seen since 2001.
Additionally, terrorists who have paid attention the current events and the
American media would have had ample proof for what would sow the seeds of chaos and
panic through the United States. The anthrax scare after September 11th, 2001 and its
resulting disruption of the country’s mail could easily have been continued and leveraged
to create even more panic and discord. The media has fed national audiences with scenes
of biological, chemical, and nuclear threats, and any terrorist keeping track of made-forTV movies since the attacks in New York and Washington DC would have an idea how
to disrupt the American public. Because terrorist groups have not acted in such a way as
to maximize terror and chaos in the American public and among Americans overseas, it
does not make sense to base models on the assumption that they are doing so.
In order to reassess our assumptions about the goals of our opponents in the war
on terror, we need to first understand our opponents. Next we need to look at their actions
and the forces at work in their environment so that we can understand better how to fight
them. For the purposes of this paper, we will consider transnational Islamist terrorist
groups, largely centered in the Middle East.
If the terrorist attacks were not motivated politically or in a utilitarian way, and
we of the Western world—particularly within the United States—are not going to have a
good grasp of the cultural factors going on to create ripe conditions for terrorist groups,
how are we to fight against attacks made on our people? We cannot fight the last war—in
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this case the Cold War, a war of ideologies—because it’s familiar. While we might fight
with those means and methods, we are going to continue to chase down a shadow
opponent and become bogged down in unpopular nation-building and guerilla warfare as
we have already within the nations of Afghanistan and Iraq. It is evident that something
in our presuppositions needs to change, in order that we will be able to meet this conflict
head-on. Then what is the problem we are looking for, and what is a good solution for
that problem?

1.2 Problem Statement and Approach

With an understanding of the roots of terrorism as a background for our
understanding of the Global War on Terror, it becomes evident that the forces at work in
the world that have caused our current state of war are extremely complex and entangled.
The actions that terrorists take continue to baffle us because we keep expecting them to
behave in a Western way, to seek to maximize the damage that they can do to us and to
sow chaos and panic among Americans both at home and abroad. If the war on terror is a
war in the classical Western sense, then it is not a war that transnational Islamist terrorist
groups are fighting against us.
With this in mind, then, we need to readdress the assumptions upon which we are
basing our research into systems, strategies, and problem solving for the war on terror.
While we may still need to treat this as a struggle where we seek the greatest disruption
of their networks for the least cost on our part, we know that their goals are not similarly
6

expressed and realized. Terrorism is not so much the tactic of a great army that seeks to
bring down the Western world, even if that might be part of the side effects of their
greater struggles. Instead, terrorism—particularly that directed at Western peoples—is a
symptom of greater cultural currents of change. Islamist terrorism, then, could be classed
as a cultural malaise, a sickness that comes about as a result of the environment
surrounding people who are in the midst of great transition. Instead of having a valid
cultural model for building a solid civilization for the future, people in the Middle East
are falling prey to an infectious worldview that sees the Western world as being to blame
for the problems of the Middle East in particular, and seeks to do harm to the Western
world in large symbolic gestures such as the attacks in New York and Washington DC.
Then it becomes apparent that the most useful framework from which to consider
terrorism is not that of a war against an organized opponent, but instead as a struggle to
eradicate a disease. To see terrorism, and the mindset that propagates terrorism, as an
epidemic would mean that we would have to reassess all of our strategies and many of
our models as we work to solve problems and end the Global War on Terror. Our need to
develop strategies to fight the war on terror would be better served to see the ideology of
terrorists as a virulent disease that is spreading through susceptible areas as an epidemic.
Within the business world, particularly in the study of marketing, the notion of
ideas as being infectious agents has become increasingly widespread over the past two or
three decades. This notion encourages marketers to optimize the infectiousness of the
ideas that they are promoting by adjusting the factors that go into spreading the social
epidemic. This strategy has shown extraordinarily good results for many marketers, and
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illustrates the benefits of considering ideas to be contagious like viruses or other
infectious diseases.
As we consider the state of the Middle East at present, it becomes apparent that all
of the factors necessary to spread the ideology of terrorism are present. In one sense, this
is a mindset that is being marketed to a civilization, and the Western world stands to face
more opposition if, indeed, the Islamic world does reach a tipping point where the
ideology of terrorism becomes mainstream. It would be to our benefit within the United
States to study the factors involved and find a way to do something to fend off the tipping
point that could happen to turn the Islamic world as a whole against the Western world.
The study of infection and epidemics in a purely physical sense is not merely a
descriptive idea, however. While the epidemiology of ideas has mainly been an area
researched by people who want to market new products or ideas, there are greater
applications available in the understanding of classical epidemiology. One of the first
things that would be useful to consider is the SIR model, a model of the percentages of
the population that are susceptible, infected or recovered from a specific epidemic. This
model has been used to study the nature of diseases and to put together approaches for
combating those diseases. The second part of epidemiology that would be applicable is
the idea of a strategy for the eradication of a disease that causes epidemics. These have
been put together with greater and lesser success depending on the nature of the epidemic
involved, but both polio and smallpox have been successfully treated and removed from
most of the world with these strategies.
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The mathematics of SIR models is complex and fills volumes of textbooks and
current research. Deterministic, probabilistic, and blended approaches are available, and
the factors that are tracked in the making of these models changes from one epidemic to
another. However, from these models we can see that if one understands the nature of the
epidemic that one is working with, one will have a better chance of being able to keep it
from getting out of hand. These models should work descriptively as well as being
prognostics, and should allow us to see the points at which intervention is needed. Just as
a physical epidemic can get out of hand if people are not working to track its progress
and developing strategies to contain it, this epidemic of an ideology of terrorism could
become out of hand if it is not being tracked closely and modeled in this way.
The susceptible population for the terrorist message has been pinpointed by much
of the media and analysis available—it is largely the disaffected youth of the Middle
Eastern region. What becomes more complex is discovering which of the people in this
population are susceptible to or infected by the ideology of terrorism. Additionally, those
who are recovered or immune from the ideology of terrorism need to be studied, in order
that we have a better idea of what to look to do in order to “inoculate” people against
terrorism.
At the heart of a strategy to eradicate terrorist ideology is the need for charismatic
leaders with a clear vision for the Middle Eastern region who have the clout and the will
to lead their people into the future without terrorism. Additionally, the Western world’s
insistence on standing behind leaders who do not have the interests of the larger region at
heart has complicated the process. Part of the change that Western nations will need to
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make is to understand that the modernization of the Islamic world will most likely not
mean its Westernization, and that our best approach to encouraging a world free of the
threat of terrorism from these transnational Islamist terrorist groups is to understand that
we cannot make the entire world into a copy of our own civilization. Backing charismatic
leaders who may not be in favor of Westernization but who are not anti-Western is more
likely to be a successful measure than trying to force Western ideals into a different
civilization. The key to finding a successful “inoculation” against the terrorist mentality
is to look past our own cultural norms to see what the valid replacement ideologies are
for the susceptible people.
The fact that the current Clausewitzian paradigm of Western nations continues to
be used as a set of presuppositions for model-building and problem-solving in the Global
War on Terror, particularly in political and military circles, would seem to indicate that
this paradigm works. However, the current situation in the Middle East, with the United
States military stretched out and working nation-building tasks as well as fighting the
ongoing war on terror, would seem to indicate otherwise. If we are fighting a
Clausewitzian battle, we should be seeing political and utilitarian results. Instead, we
fight people who continue to fight us even after any rational model (by Western
standards) would indicate that they surrender and cut their losses. Even though we have
demonstrated superior firepower and the will to defend ourselves, we continue to
encounter threats of action. These are not Clausewitzian strategies that our opponents are
using, and by modeling them as such, we do only ourselves a disservice.
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Instead, we need to look at the aspects of the terrorist message, as well as the
context in which it is being relayed and the people who are relaying it, and check the
message for its infectiousness. If we accept the spread of terrorist ideology within the
Middle Eastern region as a social epidemic, then we can start to use the tools developed
within epidemiology to characterize the epidemic and to work out strategies to fend off a
lethal epidemic that spirals out of control. Much as epidemiologists develop methods to
defend against a possible outbreak of SARS or the Asian bird flu, we need to be working
on methods to control the spread and, optimally, to eradicate the disease of terrorism.
Once this switch has been made, models for counterterrorism, particularly those
that work with resource allocation and optimal stopping, may well be changed. The
expected results of given strategies would have to be recalibrated, and as parallels are
made between the spread of infectious ideas and the spread of viruses, we will be better
able to understand what it is about the terrorist mentality that infects the susceptible
population. Additionally, we may be able to leverage marketing strategies to do some
spreading of a different message, one that is not hostile to Americans, so that the same
susceptible population has a chance to be “inoculated” against the terrorist mentality with
another set of ideas about how to fix the problems of the present.
Switching our assumptions to reflect a change in our conception of terrorism from
a political and utilitarian war of ideologies to a struggle to eradicate—or at least to
slow—a social epidemic would have both positive and negative consequences. The
negative consequences are primarily centered on the costs of switching to a new
framework, because change means expense and difficulty. However, the positive
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consequences of that type of switch would seem to outweigh the immediate problems the
switch would entail.
Any fundamental shift in assumptions usually means an initial outlay of costs in
order to update existing models and strategies to work with the new assumptions. It is
possible that many of the legacy approaches to modeling counterterrorist activities and
developing strategies to limit terrorist activities would be unable to be salvaged and thus
would have to be replaced with newer tactics and strategies. Some of the models that we
use to deal with the war on terror might become out of date and need replacement, and
this would mean time and allocation of resources. In the short term, it could be costly.
However, with a longer view, the costliness of switching to new assumptions is
overshadowed by the potential benefit of making that switch. Our frustrations with the
ongoing struggle against terrorists are ample evidence that fighting a utilitarian war with
these groups is not going to work. Much as the military has always done, we are
attempting to fight the last war in the present one. We get bogged down in the details of
rebuilding all the nations that we have had to fight, and the military continues to be
deployed to more and more countries around the world. It would appear that the current
paradigm is headed for a breakdown. If that happens, it could be disastrous, and
switching to thinking of this fight as the fight to contain and eventually eradicate a
potentially lethal epidemic that is threatening to spiral out of control is one mental shift
that could help to turn things around.
Applying the concepts of epidemiology to the spread of ideas is not a new notion,
but it has been applied at present in only a limited fashion. The bulk of the application

12

seems to be in the realm of marketing, where advertisers seek to leverage the power of
person-to-person communication instead of relying on unpredictable and increasingly
ineffective mass marketing techniques. We have a good basis for a descriptive
application of epidemiology to the spread of the ideology of terrorism.
On the other hand, very little exists that attempts to apply the notion of disease
control and/or eradication to the spread of ideas. Much of this is because at present the
research into epidemics of ideas centers on ideas that people desire to spread. However,
as we consider ideas and mindsets that we do not want to spread—those that make people
likely to become terrorists—we will need to seek out the way in which epidemiological
strategies can be applied to a purely ideas-based context.

1.3 Scope of Research

This study is a development of the idea of how to change the assumptions
inherent in our models of terrorism and counterterrorism. Using the models and
methodologies that exist within the field of epidemiology, the following chapters develop
the notion that terrorist ideologies are an epidemic of ideas. At present, the numbers
available are only notional; while a wealth of studies have been written about fighting
terrorism as a war, and about how to model and counter biological epidemics, little
besides marketing books has been written about epidemics of ideas.
13

Using a new perspective on terrorism, as an epidemic rather than a war,
encourages a reframing of the questions at the heart of the study of the War on Terror.
This study takes this notion and makes an initial application of the wealth of models and
information within the field of epidemiology to the notion of countering terrorism. While
it is still an initial application of a new idea, it has promise as a new paradigm for the
fight against terrorists, especially considering the fact that most of the existing
approaches to counterterrorism have been less than optimal in their results. Eventually,
further studies should be conducted to continue with this idea, so that meaningful
numbers can be developed, and more accurate models can be built. This will take the
cooperation of people within epidemiological and social sciences realms. From that point,
the models can be used as baselines for optimization problems, including resource
allocation, network flows, and other types of questions about the best way to work
against the propagation of terrorist notions.

1.4 Thesis Outline

This thesis continues in Chapter 2 to evaluate the literature that is relevant to the
topic. The literature review includes looks at current techniques used to study terrorism,
as well as at the roots of terrorism as they are currently understood. The review covers
the models that are used in the field of epidemiology and considers what has been written
about epidemic eradication strategies. In Chapter 3, the methodology of epidemiology is
explained and illustrated, particularly through different applications of mathematical
14

models and discussion of eradication strategies. Chapter 4 goes on to apply the models
and strategies described in Chapter 3 to the particular idea of terrorist ideology as an
epidemic. Finally, Chapter 5 looks at the conclusions one can make based on the analysis
in Chapter 4, and details the directions that further research could take.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Approaches to the problem of terrorism

Now that fighting terrorism, particularly Islamist extremist terrorism, has become
a priority for the American military, much has been written about the best ways in which
to do so. A large portion of the literature on the subject focuses on resource allocation for
counterterrorism. Hanes (2005) and Mitchell and Decker (2004) approach this problem
with similar approaches. Also along this line of thought, Pruitt (2003) looks at
prioritizing the factors involved in homeland security, applying a value-focused thinking
approach to the problem. The General Accounting Office’s report on Combating
Terrorism (2002) discusses recommended actions for antiterrorism at services’
installations.
The Advisory Panel to Address Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003) takes a more specialized look at the
domestic protection problem, setting priorities especially centered around the threat of
WMD used within the homeland. Another specialized approach comes from Yao and
Edmunds, et al. (2003), who consider optimal resource allocation in electrical network
defense. Again, it takes a budgeting, risk-management inspired approach, as do many of
the other papers on the subject. Much of the literature, indeed, seems to focus on the
aspect of counterterrorism that exists within the homeland, in the sense of managing risk
and optimizing systems for the lowest risk levels. In these estimates, one allocates
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resources as a response to terrorist actions, or to prevent the occurrence of such actions
on domestic soil. While such an approach has value, especially in setting priorities
between competing options, it can also be myopic, because it ignores the side of
counterterrorism that involves action overseas.
Horowitz and Yaimes (2002) also take a risk-based approach to modeling actions
that relate to counterterrorism. Their analysis involves the risks associated with
intelligence gathering and then works through building scenarios which are then assessed
for their risk factors. Much of this centers around Bayesian analysis of the probabilities of
certain events, aggregated over decision trees that are developed from the scenarios.
Another approach to the problem of terrorism centers on the idea of applying
Social Network Analysis (SNA) to terrorist networks, modeling influence factors. Renfro
(2003) takes this type of approach to model the social network within the Iranian
government, showing that when one works through the factors involved, the most
obvious pressure points are not, after all, the most influential nodes in the influence
network. Rosen and Smith (1996a, 1996b, and 1996c) work through the methodology of
influence net modeling, using Bayesian analysis of probabilities and a computer approach
to aggregating probabilities in order to detect sensitivity and pressure points within the
influence networks. Modeling social networks of terrorists has great promise, but within
the applications of SNA, there is so little consensus on the appropriate quantification of
relationships, and what has been done tends to be somewhat arbitrary. Social networks
have been used by social scientists to describe networks of individuals, but have not been
used for mathematical modeling of the networks to any great extent so far.
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Some authors approach the question of counterterrorism by modeling it in a
game-theoretic mode. Mia Bloom (2004) discusses the factors that make suicide terror a
“rational choice” when a person or group considers options for competition or conflict.
Yaimes and Horowitz (2004) create a model based on game theory for counterterrorism
intelligence analysis. It incorporates some of the same Bayesian risk analysis that some of
the papers mentioned previously have used, but puts that analysis into a game model
instead of an influence network.
Another perspective on counterterrorism can be found in an analysis of terrorist
organizations’ centers of gravity. Schweitzer (2003) does this with Al-Qaeda, discussing
the foundational pillars of their brand of extremist Islamist ideology. His particular focus
is on what makes the ideology possible, and how an information campaign could
adequately “attack” that center of gravity. This type of analysis is useful, if still
influenced by its own Western perspective. As the different models of terrorism and
counterterrorism show, a better understanding of the problems at the core of terrorism is
needed in order for those who want to counter the problem to make any progress.

2.2 Roots of terrorism

Much of the literature on the subject of the roots of terrorism suggests that the
current dire economic outlook for the youth of the Middle East and other factors such as
hunger and repressive regimes are largely to blame for the grassroots support for terrorist
groups. Blomberg, et al. (2004) make their model of terrorism using these assumptions,
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setting it up as an economic model. Garfinkel (2003) works off the assumption that
economic factors are the motivating forces behind terrorism, modeling probabilities of
terrorist action based on this assumption. This sort of thinking is facilely Western in
nature, however, and oversimplifies a much more complex set of causes and effects.
Politics and economics certainly play a part in the larger picture of what is causing
terrorism to escalate, especially among groups with roots in the Middle East. However, if
these were the only causes, we would expect to see similar situations among the rest of
the world’s poor and downtrodden people. And this we have not seen at present. Thus it
would appear that a belief that terrorism can be eradicated by simply remedying the
political and economic conditions within these countries is oversimplified.
Some authors see the roots of terrorism as being economic in nature, while others
perceive them as something psychological in nature. Borum (2003) discusses the
development of an extremist mindset, discussing the steps that take place as such a
mindset is formed. He goes through the basic four stage model that justifies terrorist acts
of violence. First, the person or group identifies an undesirable event or condition, then
they frame it as an injustice, then blame some target for the existence of that event or
condition, and last vilify or demonize the scapegoat. (Borum, 2003: 7-8) Michael J.
Mazarr (2004) provides a similar analysis of the psychological factors at work that cause
Islamic terrorism. His analysis, though, is rooted in an understanding of the current
cultural predicament of the standard Muslim in a modernized world. His article concludes
with a series of unconventional recommendations to propagate a “strategy of identity
entrepreneurs” (Mazarr, 2004: 16)
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Benjamin and Simon (2003) discuss the history behind groups such as Al-Qaeda
and other extremist Islamist organizations, detailing the philosophical lineage of current
movements. They work through the immediate history surrounding the September, 2001
attacks, and link the current phenomenon of radical Islamism to its historical precedents
and ancestors. In The Crisis of Islam (2003), Bernard Lewis discusses the history behind
radical Islamist terrorism, but he also considers the cultural factors at work that make
terrorism seem a viable alternative to these groups when they are incomprehensible to
Westerners. In particular, he focuses on the fact that the nature of Islam has always been
that of a unified church and state, which makes governments and revolutions look
extremely different than their Western cousins. These authors show that there is
something fundamentally different at the heart of the Islamic world that Westerners do
not understand. That misunderstanding, as well, creates the opportunity for differences to
inflame the existing rift between the civilizations.
Another perspective on the forces at work that have caused the current clash
between the Western world and some of the movements within the Islamic world is
incorporated in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (1996, 1993). Within this
book, Huntington explores the notion that the nature of war has been changing
throughout history, and that currently we are in the midst of a transition between the wars
of ideology that were best exemplified by the Cold War and wars between civilizations.
His definition of a civilization encompasses the things that bind together a culture such as
religion, philosophy, shared history, and other similar factors. The Western world, with
its Christian roots, forms one such civilization, the Islamic world another, the Orthodox
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cultures of Russia and Eastern Eurasia another, and the Chinese yet another of these
civilizations.
Huntington points out that the fault lines of battle exist now, in a macroscopic
scale, on the borders of these civilizations, and in a microscopic scale, the clashes are
happening in places where the civilizations intersect, such as the Balkans, the division
between Hindu and Muslim peoples that one sees in the Kashmiri region, and the
ongoing struggles in Northern Africa. As globalization marches on, the forces of
modernization are becoming increasingly dissociated from the force of Westernization,
and countries that are increasing their technological capabilities are starting to turn to
their own cultural roots as they seek the way to approach their futures with the new
resources at their disposal. The cultural dominance that the Western world has
traditionally held over developed countries, then, is waning, and more of the people
within other civilizations are expressing their discontent with Western norms.
We in the West still think that the goal of extending our cultural values of
freedom, democracy and free market economics is something that other countries should
embrace as well, and have incorporated this type of thinking into our rebuilding of the
countries of Afghanistan and Iraq. However, it is likely that the people of another
civilization see this influence as meddlesome and intrusive, and seen from that light, the
increasing rumbles of discontent with the ongoing American presence in the Middle East
can be understood, if not remedied. Huntington makes the point that the divisions
between civilizations are likely only to grow more profound as the rest of the world
continues to modernize and become wealthier. Thus it appears that approaching the war
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on terror and expecting to rebuild the Middle East into a free-market democratic (in other
words, Western) region is impractical. Expecting that the forces of modernization will do
so naturally is equally problematic.
If, then, we have reached a point in history where the Middle East is ripe for
change and is not looking to the Western world for guidance in that change, where will
the region look? The Islamic world, deep in the throes of modernization, is ripe to be led
by visionary leaders who have a distinct path for the future mapped out. Some of the
factors that make this region ripe for visionaries include the large numbers of
disenfranchised youth, the return to the cultural roots of the region, and the psychological
need for a narrative that can be provided by a leader who understands the region and the
forces at work within it.
As Harris (2002) points out in “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology,” much of what
motivated the terrorist attacks of 9-11 was not political or utilitarian in nature. Instead,
America was used as a prop in the greater story that these leaders were telling to their
followers. The bringing down of the Twin Towers was, in effect, an act of high drama, a
David bringing down Goliath situation. Instead of calibrating the attack for the effect it
would have on America—whether the leaders of the country or the people within the
country—the attacks were intended as a sweeping gesture that would capture the hearts
and imaginations of the people of the Middle East, who were looking for something to
believe in, since their immediate circumstances have been so hard to deal with.
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2.3 Epidemiology of Ideas

Thinking of a mindset, of a particular idea or ideology as an epidemic is by no
means a new concept. In the book The Tipping Point (Gladwell, 2000), the author goes
over much of the research that has been done over the past few decades into trend
research and how ideas spread between people. Many other books have been written
about the concept of “viral marketing” (creating word-of-mouth marketing that spreads
between people as a virus would), permission marketing (Godin, 1999) and other such
approaches to marketing. In a world that is oversaturated with advertisements, the notion
of leveraging the infectious nature of new ideas between people has revolutionized the
arena of marketing. Emanuel Rosen (2000) discusses The Anatomy of Buzz, and the
notion of how one creates word-of-mouth marketing, detailing the strategies and the
principles behind doing this. Al and Laura Ries (2002) make a similar point in their book,
detailing the need to make ideas infectious on a person-to-person level. Seth Goden
(2002) discusses the need for novelty and remarkableness in marketing—essentially a
blueprint for making an idea or the conveyance of an idea more “sticky” or infectious.
The typical breakdown of the factors that make an idea spread are the people who
spread ideas, the nature of the message that conveys the idea, and the context of the
message delivered. Once these factors are leveraged properly, an idea can be
disseminated to enough people, remembered by them, and there will come a critical
time—a tipping point—at which the idea will have reached saturation point and a trend
will result or action will be taken. Trend research is the most innocuous of the
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applications of this notion; taken further, one can see that fomenting of revolutions and
coups often happen in the same way.
Gladwell speaks of the people who are instrumental in the spread of an infectious
message in a chapter called “The Law of the Few”. It is important to note that as one
considers the spread of ideas, there are relatively few people needed to make an
ideological epidemic take hold. The three specific types of people involved are what he
calls Connectors, Mavens, and Salesmen.
Connectors are people who have an exorbitant number of social contacts, due to
factors including personality and their jobs. These people have larger numbers of friends
and acquaintances than the average person, and keep up with their social networks.
Because of this, their influence is spread over a much greater portion of the population. If
the message in question gets to a Connector, it will have a better chance of reaching the
number of people that it needs to in order to take hold and become an epidemic.
The next type of person who spreads a social epidemic (or ideological epidemic)
is what Gladwell calls a Maven. These people are well-schooled in their areas of
expertise, and because they know what they are talking about, people that they know will
listen to their advice and recommendations for products. If a good product reaches a
Maven, he or she will relay the message, and his or her recommendation carries more
weight with other people than a remark from any other person.
Salesmen are the final type of people that Gladwell profiles as instrumental in the
spreading of social epidemics. These people can move ideas farther simply by nature of
their charm and persuasiveness. When convinced that they have a good idea that they
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would like to recommend to others, these people have the resources to persuade those
they speak to. In this sense, a Salesman will have a greater chance of making a message
take hold when they speak to one of the people that they know, or even when they speak
to people that they encounter by chance.
Connectors, Mavens and Salesmen are the people who make social epidemics
start to spread. These people are instrumental in the beginning of an ideological
epidemic. It is clear that within the Islamic world, people such as Osama bin Laden may
be Salesmen, where there are imams within mosques who are Mavens, and other
Muslims who are Connectors, able to spread these ideas from one locale to another.
However, while the people involved in an epidemic of ideas are instrumental, the idea
being conveyed within an epidemic—the message—is pivotal as well.
The important aspect of making a message work is in its packaging—a message
needs to be “sticky” to be able to start a social epidemic. Gladwell highlights that while
the need to make a message sticky is irrefutable, the challenge of what exactly will make
the message sticky is much more complex. Marketers have been working with this
difficulty as long as advertising has been used to sell products, and there is no hard and
fast rule that always works. What Gladwell points out is that an adaptive and innovative
approach at packaging a message that one wants to spread is what is necessary to make a
message sticky in the first place, and then to continue to make it sticky. From the success
of transnational terrorist groups within the Middle East to recruit and spread their
message to the people of their region, it would appear that they are working on the
stickiness of the messages that they wish to convey. Thus the nature of the message itself
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is important as one considers its ability to start a social epidemic, but it is also important
to keep in mind the context within which the message is being conveyed.
The context of the message that one wants to start a social epidemic is as
important as the message itself and the people who convey it. People are greatly
influenced by their environments, as Malcolm Gladwell points out, and the environment
within which one experiences a message is as instrumental in its ability to cause an
epidemic of ideas as the message itself or who one hears the message from. This
consideration leads Gladwell into an overview of sociological research into group
behavior and the different ways that people are able and willing to behave given different
situations. Additionally, he discusses how there is a magic number—150—that seems to
be the typical size of a real social network for any person. If a group smaller than that
number attaches itself to a particular idea, most of its members will go along, for
community spirit, while in a larger group, people start to become divided and alienated.
The cell structure of most terrorist groups and the inherently local aspect of much of what
these groups do caters to this need for an appropriate context for the spreading of the
message and the continuing of the social epidemic that is the ideology of terrorism.
The other branch of the study of epidemics of ideas is the study of memetics. This
somewhat controversial field of study looks at idea units—memes—as being in essence
viruses of the mind, infectious agents that propagate through populations much as
epidemics vector through populations. Aunger (2002) discusses this phenomenon as it
occurs culturally, while Chilton (2005) discusses a particular case of ideas as viruses, as
conveyed in the text Mein Kampf. While the field of memetics seems largely to be
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philosophical and esoteric in nature, the basic central tenet of idea-units that are
contagious much as viruses are contagious is a valuable insight. Specifically, this insight
is how a particular meme or set of memes, like Islamist extremism, might be rightly
thought of as an epidemic of ideas or a social epidemic that is raging through a part of the
world.
Thus as we consider what may move terrorism from being a containable problem
to a full-fledged epidemic within the Middle East, we need to track these factors. The
people who are spreading the ideology of terrorism, the packaging of the message of
terrorist groups, and the context within which this message is being spread are all
important pieces of the puzzle of which to take note. Marketers within the Western world
have been able to leverage these factors very effectively as they work on word-of-mouth
or “viral marketing”, and their success should give us an example of how this sort of
process works. Understanding the cultural influences that make the “market” different in
the Islamic world will be pivotal for an understanding of the possible success or failure of
a terrorist epidemic, but it is something that needs to be tracked carefully.

2.4 SIR models: Deterministic Modeling of Infectious Diseases

The SIR model is one of a set of tools used by epidemiologists to understand the
nature of a particular epidemic. The letters of the acronym stand for susceptible, infected
and recovered, and refer to numbers of people within any given population that fall into
one of those four categories in reference to the epidemic. A typical SIR model (shown
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over time) can be seen in the figure below. This is a useful tool for tracking the progress
of an epidemic, as well as to see the progress of the infection itself, with such
characteristics as latency before symptoms, virulence of the infection, and other qualities.
(Trottier and Philippe, 2001)

Figure 1: SIR model of measles epidemic
http://www.ispub.com/ostia/index.php?xmlFilePath=journals/ijid/vol1n2/model.xml

A SIR model, or other compartmentalized deterministic model of an epidemic, is
based on modeling the rates involved in transmission of the disease, contact between
members in the population, population growth, and rates of recovery. Hethcote (2000)
discusses the mathematics involved in standard and more involved SIR models. Trottier
and Phillippe (2001, 2002, and 2003) discuss deterministic modeling, such as SIR
models, and the type of sensitivity analyses and repercussions of such tactics as
immunization at birth. Li et al. (2001) discuss the relevance of adding vertical
transmission into deterministic models, and show the resulting changes that occur within
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the differential equations that make up the core of the deterministic model. The
mathematics of these models are further explored and explained in Chapter 3.
Modeling an epidemic is a useful thing to do in order to gain insight into the
particular factors that make up that epidemic. Some diseases lend themselves, more than
others, to being targeted for elimination from the global community. One of the ways to
measure an epidemic’s potential for an elimination strategy is to look at the rates defined
in the deterministic model (Kretzschmar et al, 2004). Once a meaningful model for the
epidemic of terrorist ideology has been developed, it is likely that these rates could be
defined.

2.5 Infectious Disease Eradication Strategies

Another aspect of epidemiology that has potential for application to the struggle
against terrorism is the notion of a strategy for the eradication of a disease. Many of these
have happened over time, with the most famous being the real eradication of smallpox. In
the public health community, there is a distinction between the elimination of a disease
(or elimination of infections) and the eradication of a disease. Elimination of a disease is
defined as a reduction to zero of disease incidence in a particular geographic region as a
result of deliberate efforts, while eradication is considered a permanent reduction to zero
on a global scale of the incidence of infections. (Dowdle, 1999: 23)
There are two types of eradication strategies applied to infectious diseases, mass
vaccination and ring vaccination. (Kretzschmar et al, 2004: 832) The original plan to
29

eradicate smallpox was with mass immunization, which worked for much of the
developed world, where there were the resources to do that, but when the effort spread to
the developing world, it was not feasible to immunize the entire population of these areas.
Instead, a new strategy was developed. When a new case of smallpox was discovered, the
person would be isolated, as would the people who lived within a certain radius of that
person. Additionally, house-to-house searches would be made in a wider radius in order
to track the progress of the epidemic. All the people within the smaller radius would be
immunized and tagged as potential outbreaks, and their names would be removed from
the list of these once the incubation period for the illness had passed. Using this ring
vaccination strategy, the people fighting to eradicate smallpox were able to concentrate
resources and effort in more focused doses, and better able to allocate what they had
available to the necessary places. In this way, a better smallpox elimination strategy was
developed, and this eventually allowed health workers to eradicate the disease. Fenner
(2002) discusses the particular features of smallpox, both biological and sociopolitical,
that made it a good candidate for an elimination strategy such as was developed. At
present, the world health community is concentrating efforts such as these to eliminate
poliomyelitis. Joyner and Rogers (2001) and Aylward et al. (1999) discuss this effort and
the particular characteristics of the poliovirus that render it a good candidate for
elimination.
If the ideology behind terrorism is an epidemic that has the potential to spread
through large portions of the Islamic world, then we need to be able to not only know
how it spreads, but also have a feel for what we can do to limit the spread of the epidemic
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and, optimally, to eradicate that epidemic. With this goal in mind, it becomes apparent
that more than marketing products could result from a careful application of
epidemiological concepts to the question of the spread of the terrorist ideology. If we
were to gain a good picture of the nature of the infection, using a SIR-type model and
other characteristics of the ideology, and we were able to use that information to build a
strategy for the eradication of the epidemic, we might have success in the fluid war on
terror. Then we need to consider where the parallels between the terrorist ideology and a
physical epidemic exist.

2.6 Summary

The question of how best to deal with terrorism has been tackled by many
different authors in many different ways, particularly since the terrorist attacks on the
United States in September, 2001. All sorts of policy and approaches to resource
allocation and other ways to counter terrorism have been considered. However, most of
the approaches that come from Western authors incorporate Western paradigms into their
understanding of the problem of terrorism. Authors blindly assume that terrorism can be
linked to poverty or other economic factors, or that a purely defensive approach is the
best way to counter terrorism.
Rational behavior, such as is assumed within Western confrontations, is expected
from Islamist extremists, and when their cultural paradigms allow them to operate outside
of rational expectations, many of the Western models of their behavior are made useless.
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Because there is a fundamental divide between the cultures of the West and of Islam, the
problem of terrorism must be approached in a different manner.
To understand terrorism in a way that will allow people in the West to make
appropriate models of the factors involved will require an understanding of the
psychological and cultural underpinnings of extremist Islamic ideology. Unlike a state
that fights a war in a pragmatic, policy-oriented manner, terrorists do not fight or recruit
as Westerners might expect. It would do well to think of terrorism, or rather the ideology
behind it, as an epidemic of ideas.
Epidemics have been studied extensively by scientists; a whole field of
epidemiology has grown around this study. Mathematical epidemiology uses
mathematics to model the spread of epidemics, so that they can be understood and
countered more effectively. If the ideology of terrorism can be understood as an epidemic
of ideas, then modeling it as an epidemic and studying eradication strategies in light of
that epidemic would be useful.
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Chapter 3: Mathematical Models of Infectious Diseases

3.1 The SIR Model: An Overview

Epidemiologists have over time developed an entire branch of epidemiology
called mathematical epidemiology, which concentrates on modeling the spread of
infectious disease mathematically. Different tools exist, tailored to the varying factors
involved that the epidemiologists seek to track. However, a basic model that is relevant to
our exploration of terrorism as a social epidemic is the classic SIR model.
births
horizontal

S
deaths

transfer

I

incidence

from I

deaths

R
deaths

Figure 2: SIR model flow diagram
A SIR model takes the population that interests the epidemiologist and partitions
it into several categories, denoted by the letters S, I, and R which, respectively, mean
susceptible, infectious, and recovered. The categories are assumed to be mutually
exclusive and, in the classic model, transitions only occur from S to I and I to R. This
means that R, the recovered category, is an absorbing state and that eventually an
epidemic will converge to this state, in a model where there are no birth and death rates
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included (the SIR epidemic model, Figure 4). When birth and death rates are accounted
for, there will be an equilibrium distribution of susceptible, infected and recovered
populations (in the SIR endemic model, Figure 10).
Similar partition-based models include MSEIR, SEIR, SIRS, SEIRS, and
MSEIRS models. (Hethcote, 2000: 601) The extra categories included here are M, infants
with passive immunity that transfers from their mother, who will transition into the
susceptible category, and E, the class of individuals who have been exposed to the
infection and are in a latent period before becoming infectious. SIRS, MSEIRS, and
SEIRS models (any models with a concluding S) include a transition back into
susceptibility for recovered individuals, with a corresponding rate of leaving recovery
into susceptibility.
For the sake of simplicity, our initial model of terrorism as an epidemic will be a
simple SIR model. An argument could be made for inclusion of the E (exposed) category,
a latent period where a person exposed to the “infection” of the terrorist mindset is not
yet likely to convert others to that mindset. It would be difficult to retrieve meaningful
numbers to approximate how long that latent period lasts, and it is unlikely that surveys
exist with that sort of data. Because of these considerations, we will begin our exploration
of terrorism as an epidemic by modeling it with a simple SIR model.
Within these models, the common assumption to make is that the time of transfer
from one compartment and into another is exponentially distributed. This assumption
exploits the memoryless property of exponential distributions. In a standard differential
equations model, the rates of transfer will be designated by terms such as δ, ε, and γ and
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multiplied by the populations within their corresponding compartments: δM εE and γI.
The number of people in the population who are still in the latent period t time units after
entering it is a function of the rate of transfer, εE.

P{time in E > t} = e−εt
Because the expectation of an exponentially distributed random variable is the
reciprocal of its rate, we have the following correspondences between the rates and the
expected time within each of these three categories.
Table 1: Expected times within categories M, E, and I
1
∂

1

ε
1

γ

Period of passive immunity (time within M category)

Mean latent period (time within E category)

Mean infectious period (time within I category)

While movement between these categories is relatively simple to track, based on
observations and statistics about the infection in question, when it comes to modeling the
transfer into the infected category, more is needed to model the process mathematically.
With that in mind, mathematical epidemiologists developed the threshold numbers for
infections, and use those in a system of differential equations to complete the model.
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3.2 Threshold Numbers: R0, σ, and R

Within an epidemic or endemic SIR (MSEIR, or SEIR) model, R0, the basic
reproduction number, is the first threshold number to consider. R0 is the average number
of secondary infections that result when a single infected person is introduced into a fully
susceptible population. R0 is only defined at the beginning of an epidemic, but it relates to
another significant number for SIR models, the contact number, σ.
The contact number for a SIR model is defined to be the average number of
adequate contacts that a typical infected individual would have during their entire time in
the infectious category. An adequate contact is one of significant duration to produce a
secondary infection when an infectious individual is exposed to a susceptible individual.
Thus, at time t = 0, R0 = σ. Thereafter, σ is used in the mathematical characterization of
the epidemic, rather than R0. This quantity, in turn, leads to the third important number
used in mathematical modeling of epidemics, which is R, the replacement number.
The replacement number, R, of a SIR model is defined as the average number of
secondary infections that a typical infectious individual produces during the entire period
of infectiousness. Again, at time t = 0, R = R0 = σ.
Each of these threshold numbers behaves differently over time. After the time of
invasion (t = 0), R0 ceases to be defined. For most models, σ remains constant throughout
the time of the infection. The exception to this rule is in models where after the infection
has been introduced, new classes of infections arise with reduced infectiousness. In this
case, σ would become smaller as the epidemic continued over time. However, this type
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of model is used rarely; typically σ is treated as a constant. R, however, will always
decrease over time within a SIR model. As the susceptible population decreases, the
number of infections that an infectious individual can produce will continue to decrease
proportionately.
Thus, at t = 0, R0 = σ = R. Over time, though, R0 becomes undefined, and σ
remains constant while R decreases, because after the time of invasion, only a fraction of
the people that any infected person has adequate contact with will be susceptible to
infection. We can combine these results into the following formula, true for all SIR
(MSEIR, or SEIR) models. (Hethcote, 2000: 601-604)

R0 ≥ σ ≥ R

3.3 The Epidemic SIR Model

Given the compartments and parameters that we have discussed above, the table
below summarizes the important notation that characterizes a SIR model. Note that the
fractional representations of the population should add up to 1. Thus s + i + r = 1, a fact
that the differential equations that set up the model draw upon. Note that this is the
epidemic model, one developed to track an infection over a short time span.
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Table 2: SIR Model Notation

S

Number of individuals within the S (susceptible) compartment

I

Number of individuals within the I (infectious) compartment

R

Number of individuals within the R (recovered) compartment

N

Number in total population (S + I + R = N)

s

Fraction of population that is susceptible (s = S/N)

i

Fraction of population that is infectious (i = I/N)

r

Fraction of population that is recovered (r = R/N)

R0

Basic reproduction number (or rate)

σ

Contact number

R

Replacement number

t

Time, an independent variable

β

Average number of adequate contacts of an individual per time unit

γ

Rate of transfer out of I category

The definitions above lead to several relevant facts about the categories and rates
within the model, some of which are detailed below.
⎛ 1⎞ β
σ = β⎜ ⎟ =
⎝γ ⎠ γ

Contact number is equivalent to contact rate, β, multiplied by mean
length of infection, 1/γ.

s(t) =

S(t)
N

Susceptible fraction of population

i(t) =

I(t)
N

Infected fraction of population
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βI
N

=βi

Average number of adequate contacts with infectious individuals for
one susceptible individual per time unit

⎛β I⎞
⎜ ⎟ S = β Nis
⎝N⎠

Average number of new cases per time unit, based on S = Ns being
the total number of susceptible individuals within the population

The initial value problem for this model is set up with the differential equations
that follow:
d S −β IS
=
dt
N

S(0) = S0 ≥ 0

d I β IS
=
−γI
N
dt

I(0) = I 0 ≥ 0

dR
=γI
dt

R(0) = R0 ≥ 0

This model, assuming a short time span, includes no births and deaths. When one
divides the equations above by the total population (N, a constant in the epidemic model),
the following equations result.
ds
= −β is
dt

s(0) = s0 ≥ 0

di
= β is− γ i
dt

i(0) = i0 ≥ 0

dr
=γi
dt

r(0) = r0 ≥ 0

Note that r(t) = 1 – s(t) – i(t). Thus we have that the solution curves to these
equations fall within the triangular region T, known as the phase plane for the epidemic
model, where

T = {(s,i):s ≥ 0,i ≥ 0,s+ i ≤1}.
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σ=3
1/γ = 3

i(t)

s(t)

Figure 3: Phase plane portrait of epidemic SIR model

Note that when σ = 3 and 1/γ = 3 (days), the paths over time curve from the right
side of T to the left, eventually dying out as i(t) = 0.
The same functions can be seen in the graph below, where s(t) and i(t) are shown
against time. The tendency of a typical epidemic is for i(t) to peak and then die down, as
the susceptible fraction reaches a steady-state number.
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Figure 4: Susceptible and infected population proportions over time

When σ increases, the peak proportion of the population that is infectious
increases dramatically. This peak of infected population happens in a shorter period of
time, but the duration of the epidemic becomes correspondingly shorter. Figure 5 and
Figure 6 illustrate this graphically.
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σ=9

i(t)

s(t)
Figure 5: Higher contact number SIR model phase plane

s(t)
r(t)
i(t)

time
Figure 6: Higher contact number SIR model over time

Conversely, when σ decreases, the peak infectious proportion of the population
becomes much smaller. Because the proportion of infectious individuals is not large
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enough at any point to expose the entire susceptible population to infection, the infection
tapers out before the susceptible population is reduced to proportions near zero. When σ
is small enough, an epidemic’s end state will result in only part of the population having
been exposed to the infection. Figure 7 and Figure 8 graphically illustrate the impact of a
low contact number for an epidemic.
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σ = 1.5
i(t)
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0.8

1

s(t)
Figure 7: Low contact number SIR model phase plane
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r(t)

i(t)
time

Figure 8: Low contact number SIR model over time

The solution paths within T, characterized by the following equation

i(t) + s(t) −

ln(s(t))

σ

= i0 + s 0 −

ln(s0 )

σ

are found from the quotient differential equation below.

1
di
= −1 +
ds
σs
Equilibrium points (the end state) can be found along the s axis in the phase plane
portrait. These are neutrally unstable for s > 1/σ and neutrally stable for s < 1/σ.
(Hethcote, 2000: 607)
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3.4 The Endemic SIR Model

An endemic model accounts for births and deaths within the population and thus
tracks an infection over a potentially longer time span than the epidemic model. If
nothing else, after an entire recovered generation dies out, the new generation will
become fully susceptible again, leaving the population open to another epidemic. The
behavior of endemic infections is actually more complex than this, however.
The model for the endemic SIR model is very much the same as for the epidemic
model, except that it incorporates a birth and death rate. The birth rate, μN, balances the
death rate, also μN. N = S + I + R, which implies that μN = μ(S + I + R) = μS + μI + μR.
Because of this, μS, μI, and μR are the death rates within susceptible, infectious, and
recovered categories, respectively, in the SIR endemic model. This assumption ensures
well-behaved movement within the model but is somewhat optimistic; in our terrorism
example it is quite likely that the population is growing exponentially. The mean lifetime
for a given individual is 1/μ, which can be found easily from demographic reports about
regions of interest.
The initial value problem is set up as follows:
dS
β IS
= μ N− μ S−
dt
N

S(0) = S0 ≥ 0

d I β IS
=
− (γ + μ)I
dt
N

I(0) = I 0 ≥ 0

dR
= γ I− μ R
dt

R(0) = R 0 ≥ 0
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Because the proportions of the population are assumed to remain constant
whether the population grows or shrinks, we divide by N to produce the following
equations.
ds
= μ − μ s− β is
dt

s(0) = s0 ≥ 0

di
= β is− (γ + μ)i
dt

i(0) = i0 ≥ 0

dr
= γ i− μ r
dt

r(0) = r0 ≥ 0

The threshold numbers are slightly different for this model as well:

R0 = σ =

β
(γ + μ)

where

1
(γ + μ)

is the average death-adjusted infectious period

Behavior within an endemic model tends to alternate between rapid epidemic
outbreaks and slow regeneration of the susceptible class. As time continues, an endemic
equilibrium will eventually be reached, characterized by the equations below.
se =

1

σ

ie =

μ(σ −1)
β

Figure 9 below shows the characteristic path of a solution within the phase plane,
spiraling toward an endemic equilibrium. In this case, the average lifespan is 60 days, in
order to show clearly the behavior of the solution paths.
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Figure 9: Endemic SIR model phase plane

In Figure 10, below, the damped oscillation in the infectious population becomes
clearly visible. After the first peak of epidemic outbreak, the susceptible population
gradually grows, due to birth rates in the susceptible category. When the susceptible
proportion of the population reaches a high enough point, another epidemic peak occurs,
but this time the peak looks characteristic of an epidemic with a smaller contact rate.
Because the secondary epidemics when the susceptible proportion of the population is
reduced, this effectively reduces the rate at which any infectious person is making
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adequate contact with susceptible people—because he or she will also be encountering
recovered (and thus immune) individuals.
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Figure 10: Endemic model over time

A more typical endemic model would characteristically show the infectious
population becoming negligible over time, as a result of the reduction of the birth (and
death) rate, μ. When an infection occurs over a period of days (or weeks), and expected
lifespan (1/μ) is measured in years, the results are illustrated in Figure 11, below.
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Figure 11: Typical paths for an endemic phase plane

3.5 Adding age groups to the SIR model

Because epidemics often affect different age groups differently, epidemiological
models often incorporate partitions between different age groups, in order to better show
the rates at which the disease affects these age groups. With a standard infection, it is
likely that an older individual will have more resistance to the disease, and contact rates
can vary between different age groups. Just as the endemic model incorporates another
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level of detail to the model, SIR models that incorporate age groups add another layer of
detail to the picture of the infection in question.
Age is treated as an independent variable, just as time is, and can be handled as
either a continuous function or stepwise as a series of age groups. We will choose the age
group approach as it is easier to collect and report statistical data about age groups than to
create continuous functions that express birth, death, and recovery rates in terms of age.
Age group models typically involve an assumption of exponential population growth
(Hethcote, 2000: 619-620), modeled by the following equation, where
N(t)

size of the population at time t

N’(t)

rate of change of the population at time t

b

mean natural birth rate

d

mean natural death rate.

N′(t) = (b − d)N(t)
Letting q = b – d, we have that
dN
= qN
dt
.

Given that our population is growing (or shrinking) exponentially, we assume the
distribution of proportions within the populations of n different age groups remains
constant. Let Pi denote the proportion of the total population that is in age group i, where
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
n

∑P =1
i

i=1
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This leads to the understanding that the total number of individuals within each
age group, Ni, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, can be found with the following equation.
(Hethcote, 2000: 635)
N i ( t ) = e qt Pi

Note that in the SIR model, where si = Si/Ni, ii = Ii/Ni, and ri = Ri/Ni, we have the
following property.
Pi = si + ii + ri ∀ i ∈ {1, ,n}

Part of the problem of modeling age groups is the underlying assumption that
contact rates (which previously we modeled as a constant rate, β, for all individuals
within the system) will be different between the differing age groups. Thus we have a
new set of rates that we will model as follows.
Table 3: Contact rates in the age category SIR model

βi

The contact rate between individuals in the same age group

β iβ˜ j

The contact rate between individuals in separate age groups

The total force of infection for each age group is λi, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This is
equivalent to the rate of contact across all age groups multiplied by the number of
infected in each of those age groups, and is the more complex variant of β that we used in
our previous equations. (Hethcote, 2000: 635)
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n

λi = ∑ β iβ˜ j i j , where β iβ˜ i = β i
j=1

Note that instead of using the notation β i β j , the two age category model
developed later will use the notation β ij , because it is simpler to understand. The table
below details the meaning of each of these rates.
Table 4: Meanings of β rates

β11

The rate at which infectious individuals in group 1 infect susceptibles in group 1

β12

The rate at which infectious individuals in group 2 infect susceptibles in group 1

β 21

The rate at which infectious individuals in group 1 infect susceptibles in group 2

β 22

The rate at which infectious individuals in group 2 infect susceptibles in group 2

Another rate that we need to be concerned with in the age category SIR model is
the rate at which individuals leave age category i and enter category i + 1. This rate is
labeled ci, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This rate must be distinguished from the death rate, di,
at which people in category i are dying when they are within that age group.
The flow diagram of the two-category model is detailed in Figure 12 below. This
illustrates all the important states that any particular individual can exist within and the
flow rates between these states, where the time spent in every state is assumed to be
exponentially distributed.
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Figure 12: Age category model flow diagram

With these equations and the terms that we have previously defined, we are ready
to set up the differential equations that define our age group model. This model is
characterized by a set of 3n equations, with n being the number of age groups within the
model. Note that the
d s1
= (c1 + d1 + q)P1 − [ λ1 + c1 + d1 + q]s1
dt
d i1
= λ1 s1 − [γ1 + c1 + d1 + q]i1
dt
d r1
= γ1 i1− [c1 + d1 + q]r1
dt
d si
= c i−1 si−1− [ λi + c i + di + q]si
dt

i≥2

d ii
= c i−1 ii−1+ λi si − [γ i + c i + di + q]ii
dt

i≥2
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d ri
= c i−1 ri−1+ γ i ii − [c i + di + q]ri
dt

i≥2

This definition of equations can be simplified, in the two-category case, to the
equations below. For the sake of example, we take the case where population growth rate
is zero. That is, there is a static population size and the rate at which people enter the
system is the same as the rate at which they leave the system.
d s1
= (c1 + d1 )P1 − [ λ1 + c1 + d1]s1
dt
d i1
= λ1 s1 − [γ1 + c1 + d1 ]i1
dt
d r1
= γ1 i1 − [c1 + d1 ]r1
dt
d s2
= c1 s1 − [ λ2 + c 2 + d2 ]s2
dt
d i2
= c1 i1 + λ2 s 2 − [γ 2 + c 2 + d2 ]i2
dt
d r2
= c1 r1 + γ 2 i2 − [c 2 + d2 ]r2
dt

Demographic data is available for the proportions of the population within age
groups, Pi, and the death rates within each age category, di. The rate at which people
leave each category and enter the next, ci, can be calculated by the length of time that
they spend within each age group. The final age group’s exit rate, cn, or in this case c2,
has to be calculated so that the rate at which people leave the final age group is equal to
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the rate at which they enter it. Note that, in the final category, cn just means the rate at
which individuals exit the system. For the two-category model, this means
c1P1 = (c 2 + d2 )P2

Note that our initial values, shown in Table 5 below, include a larger category P1
than P2. For the example problem, we assume that age group 1 dies at a slower rate than
age group 2, but it sustains the infection for a longer time than the second age group.
Additionally, while each age category is infected by members within itself at the same
rate, members of category 2 will have a greater likelihood of infecting those of category 1
than vice-versa.
Table 5: Two age group SIR model initial values

P1 = 0.6

P2 = 0.4

λ1 = β11 i1 + β12 i 2

λ2 = β 21 i1 + β 22 i 2

β11 = 0.75

β12 = 1.0

β 21 = 0.25

β 22 = 0.75

γ1 =

1
3

d1 =

1
200

c1 =

1
20

γ2 =
d2 =
c2 =
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Figure 13: Two age group SIR model phase plane
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Figure 14: Two age group SIR model phase plane for category 1 only

i2

s2

Figure 15: Two age group SIR model phase plane for category 2 only
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One can clearly see in the age group phase planes that the initial values that we
have set have changed the outcome for the different age categories. In particular, the
longer time of infection for the first age bracket makes the curves in the phase plane have
a much more spiral nature than they do in the second age bracket. Additionally, one can
see that the systemic equilibrium for the different age categories is going to be different
for each. In this model, the first age group converges to an endemic equilibrium with a
higher proportion of infectious individuals than does the second age group, because of the
longer duration of the infection and the inflow of susceptible individuals.
The next set of valuable information about the age group model is what the
different populations are doing over time. With this in mind, we graph the value of the
populations over time, assuming a negligible number of infected population (0.05 of the
total population), and the results follow in Figure 16, Figure 17, and Figure 18.
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Figure 16: Susceptible, infectious, and recovered fractions of age group model
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Figure 17: Susceptible, infectious, and recovered fractions of category 1
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Figure 18: Susceptible, infectious, and recovered fractions of category 2
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One can see that the shapes of the curves associated with each part of the
population are different. In this case, the overall epidemic occurs with more force in the
younger part of the population, which consequently results in an endemic equilibrium
with a larger steady-state number (relative to the total population of the younger age
category) for infected and susceptible groups, and a smaller equilibrium state for the
recovered portion of the younger population. However, since one can assume that a
younger person will eventually transition into the older category, this makes sense; the
younger age bracket is steadily losing people from its later categories to the older age
bracket. Since the older category includes the absorbing state, r2, it has a much larger
proportion (relative to the population) of recovered individuals than does the first
category.
Both epidemic and endemic models serve a purpose, and have potential
application to the problem of terrorism spreading as a social epidemic. It is a matter of
which parts of the problem that one chooses to focus on that determines which model one
would use. An epidemic model looks at a short-term problem and focuses on what the
initial outbreak of an infection is going to look like, while an endemic model tends to be
of more use to determine what the eventual steady-state distribution of the infection will
become. An endemic model assumes a longer time horizon than an epidemic model does.
Additionally, the age category model has potential use to model the spread of the
“infection” of the terrorist mindset. This would allow partitioning of the entire population
of a given region into more and less susceptible groups, and might give a more detailed
picture of the dynamics involved in the spread of terrorist ideology. However, this model
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also requires more initial settings for rates, and while many of them come directly from
known demographic data, others need to be estimated.

3.6 Applying the partition principle to varying levels of influence

Using similar partitioning methodology to that we used to develop the age
category model, we develop a model based on categories of influence. This type of model
will look similar to the age category model, but will incorporate the understanding that
the proportion of highly influential individuals will be very much less than that of normal
people in the population. However, these influential individuals can be expected to have
much greater infectiousness, which will change the force of infection values. This
incorporates the notion that some individuals will have a much greater tendency of
carrying the infection to others, the idea that The Tipping Point emphasizes in its
discussion of the people factors involved in epidemics of ideas. (Gladwell, 2000)
Partitioning can also be used to model the way an epidemic spreads through
multiple populations, such as in different regions or cities, because in this way the
differing rates of interaction can be illustrated. (Zaric and Brandeau, 2002) Such
partitions can become very complicated, especially when rates of contact between
populations are factored in, because the flow is not simply out of one population and into
another, but in and out of both. SIR models that incorporate partitioning thus have the
potential to display complex interactions of factors that influence the spread and duration
of epidemics.
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3.7 One step further: the effects of immunization on the model

Though SIR models are based on the assumption that the only way out of the
susceptible category is into the infected category, it makes sense to take the model one
step farther. In this immunization SIR model, we theorize that individuals within the
recovered category are capable of having a positive influence on susceptible individuals.
This means that, if exposed for a sufficient length of time to a recovered person, a
susceptible individual could be effectively “immunized” against the contagion in
question. Immunization, in this sense, means that the disease never infected the
individual. While this assumption would not make sense within a typical biological
epidemic model, it can be incorporated into a model of an epidemic of ideas. In this case,
one can expect the recovered category to be composed of people who have a positive (or
neutral) influence on susceptible people. The main item of importance is that the
influence of the recovered category will enable those who are susceptible to infection to
bypass the infected state. In essence, their influence is an inoculation against the
infection.
This model will look very much like the model partitioned by influence, but will
incorporate the effects of normal and highly influential people in both infectious and
immunizing ways. Figure 19, below, is the flow diagram of this model. Category 1 stands
for normal individuals and category 2 for highly influential individuals.
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Figure 19: Partition model flow diagram with immunization effects

While all our rates from before remain what they were before, there is an
additional factor of the κ rates, which will be the forces of immunization for each of the
susceptible groups. These can be defined as following:

κ1 = (α11 r1 + α12 r2 ) s1

κ 2 = (α 21 r1 + α 22 r2 ) s 2

The α values here measure the rates at which one population of recovered will
immunize the susceptible population of the category in question. These α values are
analogous to the β values associated with force of infection rates.
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Table 6: Meanings of α rates

α11

The rate at which recovered individuals in group 1 immunize group 1 susceptibles

α12

The rate at which recovered individuals in group 2 immunize group 1 susceptibles

α 21

The rate at which recovered individuals in group 1 immunize group 2 susceptibles

α 22

The rate at which recovered individuals in group 2 immunize group 2 susceptibles

The immunization factor will change the shape of the curves associated with the
epidemic, depending on what initial values are chosen. The equations below and the rates
in Table 7 set up the influence model with immunization.
d s1
= (c1 + d1 )P1 − [ λ1 + κ1 + c1 + d1]s1
dt
d i1
= λ1 s1 − [γ1 + c1 + d1 ]i1
dt
d r1
= κ1 s1+ γ1 i1 − [c1 + d1 ]r1
dt
d s2
= c1 s1 − [ λ2 + κ 2 + c 2 + d2 ]s2
dt
d i2
= c1 i1 + λ2 s 2 − [γ 2 + c 2 + d2 ]i2
dt
d r2
= c1 r1 + κ 2 s2 + γ 2 i2 − [c 2 + d2 ]r2
dt
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Table 7: Influence model with immunization initial values

P1 = 0.99

P2 = 0.01

λ1 = β11 i1 + β12 i 2

λ2 = β 21 i1 + β 22 i 2

β11 = 0.75

β12 = 100

β 21 = 0.2

β 22 = 25

κ1 = α11 r1 + α12 r2

κ 2 = α 21 r1 + α 22 r2

α11 = 0.5

α12 = 75

α 21 = 0.1

α 22 = 20

d1 =

1
100

c1 =

1
20

γ1 =

d2 =
c2 =

1
3

1
100

c1 P1
247
− d2 =
P2
50

γ2 =
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Figure 20: Influence category SIR model with immunization phase plane
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Figure 21: Influence category SIR model with immunization over time
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Since normal people, who compose P1, are such a large percentage of the
population, the graphs barely change for their statistics considered alone. However, the
difference between these graphs and the graphs for influential people is considerably
greater, and one can see a great difference between the epidemic at large compared to that
within those people of influence. One can see this influence in Figure 22 and Figure 23
below.
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Figure 22: Highly influential individuals phase plane
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Figure 23: Highly influential individuals over time

Modeling immunization in this way, the epidemic curve scarcely changes in
shape. However, instead of settling to an endemic equilibrium point, the curves for s(t)
and i(t) trend toward zero, meaning that r(t) trends toward 1. In this sense, the growing
influence of the recovered population will eventually obliterate the incidence of the
infection. This is not a realistic expectation to make about a biological epidemic, but
when one is modeling a social epidemic, it could be close to the mark. When an idea
stops having followers, it tends to die out.
For most epidemiological models for biological infections, immunization is
modeled by reducing the inflow into the susceptible category and correspondingly
increasing the inflow into the recovered category. Trottier and Phillippe (2003) discuss
the expected change that inoculation will have on an epidemic, showing that it lengthens
the intervals between epidemic outbreaks (initial and following peaks in a model like
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Figure 10), and each epidemic outbreak is smaller in scale until they disappear altogether.
Modeled into the differential equations for the SIR model, this change is a reduction of
the inflow into the susceptible category. The equations that make up an endemic SIR
model become the following, where μ is the rate of people entering (and leaving) the
system, γ is the rate at which people recover from infection, β is the rate at which people
become infected, and p is the rate of immunization of the susceptible population.
ds
= μ(1− p) − μ s− β is
dt

s(0) = s0 ≥ 0

di
= β is− (γ + μ)i
dt

i(0) = i0 ≥ 0

dr
= μp + γ i− μ r
dt

r(0) = r0 ≥ 0

The disadvantage of modeling immunization this way is that it does not capture
the influence that “recovered” individuals will have on susceptible individuals. Because
ideas that are contrary to the epidemic in question are infectious (though perhaps less so
than the epidemic), those who are “recovered” from the infection exert their influence on
susceptible individuals. In that sense, our proposed model of immunization to a social
epidemic makes more sense than the typical biological model.

3.8 Applications of SIR models

Not only is a SIR model descriptive of an epidemic, but it also can be used to
solve problems related to the control of such epidemics. Zaric and Brandeau (2002) work
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through a resource allocation problem based on a multiple population model. In their
case, expected years of life for HIV/AIDS infected individuals are maximized, based on
the assumption of a group of control measures that will reduce “risky behavior”
(sufficient contact rates) within given populations. Alternately, they show, one can
minimize the expected number of new infections over time, based on a dynamic
allocation of resources into these control measures. The SIR model, in any form, shows
the boundaries of the feasible region that any optimization problem for control measures
would have to exist within. Thus, not only resource allocation problems, but control
strategies could be evaluated over the modeled epidemic, once the changes that a control
measure would have on a population are modeled appropriately.

3.9 Infectious Disease Eradication: Necessary Conditions and Strategies

3.9.1 Necessary Conditions for Eradication

According to Frank Fenner (2002: 9-13), the necessary conditions that make a
particular infectious disease a good candidate for eradication are as follows in Table 8.
These factors, while targeted to biological infections, do have correlates when one
considers social epidemics.
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Table 8: Factors contributing to eradication candidacy

Severity (high mortality rates or terrible side effects)
No animal reservoir of the virus/infectious agent
Slight incidence of undiagnosable cases
No recurrence of disease
Limited number of subtypes
Effective methods to confirm diagnosis
A stable, effective vaccine is available
Cases not infectious until diagnosable

It is apparent that for an eradication strategy to be possible, the infection needs to
be something clearly defined, easily and reliably diagnosed, and an effective vaccine
needs to be available to use in any eradication strategy. Additionally, a perceived need for
the eradication strategy needs to exist as well. If the world community does not agree that
the disease is a threat sufficient to warrant a costly intervention, then containing the
epidemic will be much more difficult. Assuming that these conditions exist for an
infection, then there are different strategies available to effect the eradication of the
disease.

3.9.2 Eradication strategies

The most straightforward strategy to eradicate a disease is mass vaccination. This
has been applied regionally with good results for many of the common diseases such as
smallpox, polio, mumps, measles, rubella, and even chickenpox. However, such a
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strategy depends on the existence of enough vaccine and enough economic resources to
pay for the vaccine for the entire population. Additionally, until the infection is
eradicated globally, mass vaccination still needs to be applied for all newborns into a
population, so this is a high-cost but very effective strategy.
However, when resources are limited and eradication is still sought, ring
vaccination is the strategy of choice. This strategy depends on surveillance in all the
affected regions and quick diagnosis of new infections. Once new infections occur, the
social network surrounding the newly infected person is inoculated, usually measured by
a radius of a certain distance from the home of the infected person. Outside that radius,
house-to-house searches are made for signs of infection that may have come out that far,
and if infection is discovered, the same set of actions are applied starting there. This
strategy targets infections as they occur, and allows a much more limited amount of
resources, both funding and vaccines.
The success of ring vaccination is very much dependent upon the level of
surveillance in the affected regions and the accuracy of diagnosis early on in an infection.
This is why a disease prone to recurrence or difficult to diagnose early in its infectious
stages would be difficult to eradicate with this sort of strategy. In the case of a lessobvious infection, the only effective strategy would be mass vaccination.
With any eradication strategy, the results may not be immediately observable. An
infection that has become an epidemic usually will run its course. However, an
eradication program will ensure that the disease does not become an endemic infection
within a population, and will reduce the successive outbreaks of a disease. An eradication
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program is a long-term solution to the problem of infectious diseases, not an immediate
fix of the epidemic at hand.

3.10 Summary

The mathematical models of epidemiology are diverse and can incorporate many
different interactions of variables involved. The simplest form of these models, the SIR
epidemic model, shows over the short term how a single epidemic will play out through
time. An endemic model, which requires more entry data, also gives more information
about the long term and where endemic levels of a disease can be expected to settle.
These models can then be partitioned, either by age groups or by influence
categories or by separate populations affected by the same epidemic. Conceivably, all
these factors could be incorporated into one extremely large and complex model. These
partitioned models, again, require more rates to determine the shape of the model, but
they also give a more detailed picture of the epidemic in question when they are
developed.
SIR models also can be used to inform the application of eradication strategies to
epidemics. The different characteristics of an epidemic are what make it a better
candidate for one or another eradication strategy. All of this information that is
incorporated into mathematical models of epidemics has direct use for modeling of an
epidemic of ideas, specifically the outbreak of extremist Islamist thought that encourages
terrorism.
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Chapter 4: Applying Epidemic Models and Strategies to Terrorism

This chapter’s goal is to demonstrate how the mathematical epidemiological
models developed in Chapter 3 may be applied to the epidemiology of ideas through
several notional examples.

4.1 The epidemic SIR model of terrorism

The first challenge to modeling terrorism in a SIR model is to decide what is the
population within which to model. Judging from the literature on the subject, the likely
susceptible population to the terrorist mindset is that of males between the ages of 15 and
35, approximately. (Urdal, 2004) There are terrorist leaders who are much older than that,
but those leaders seem to be the exception rather than the rule, and even if older people
might be sympathetic to the extremist mindset, they appear to be less likely to act on it.
Another characteristic of the susceptible population is that it exists within the Muslim
world; for the case of our model we will choose to model with the young male
demographic within a single region. This is a notional model just to exemplify how
epidemiological concepts could be applied to better understand the dynamics of the
spread of terrorism.
Within our young male regional population, then, we have to partition the
population, N, into the classes of S, I, and R. Susceptible individuals are those who have
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not yet been exposed to the terrorist mindset for a sufficient amount of time to become
infected with it. For our model we will start with the assumptions that s0 = 1 and i0 = r0 =
0. These will be starting conditions. Infective individuals are those who have been
converted to an extremist Islamist mindset, who are ready and willing to be a part of the
narrative that the terrorist leaders have presented them with. Finally, recovered
individuals are those who have, in the past, been “infected” with the terrorist mindset but
who have since changed their minds or become disaffected with that perspective on the
world. We will proceed on the assumption that a recovered individual is not likely to
become re-infected with the terrorist mindset.
Table 9: SIR Model Notation

S

Number of individuals within the S (susceptible) compartment

I

Number of individuals within the I (infectious) compartment

R

Number of individuals within the R (recovered) compartment

N

Number in total population (S + I + R = N)

s

Fraction of population that is susceptible (s = S/N)

i

Fraction of population that is infectious (i = I/N)

r

Fraction of population that is recovered (r = R/N)

R0

Basic reproduction number (or rate)

σ

Contact number

R

Replacement number

t

Time, an independent variable
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β

Average number of adequate contacts of an individual per time
unit

γ

Rate of transfer out of I category

Unlike most of the diseases modeled by epidemiologists in SIR (or SEIR, or
MSEIR) models, the time periods associated with the spread of terrorism are not typically
measured in days. An adequate contact, one that would be sufficient to spread the
“infection” to a susceptible individual, is likely to be one that is the result of weeks or
months of exposure to an infectious individual. Additionally, once one is infected with
the terrorist mindset, the time that one remains infectious is likely to be measured in
months or years.
Table 10: Notional rates for terrorist SIR model

Time unit

6 months

β

2 per time unit on average

1/ γ

10 time units (5 years) on average

σ

20 over the average “lifespan”

Using these rates in the differential equations below, the epidemic model of the
infection of terrorism can be seen in Figure 24 and Figure 25. Bear in mind that the rates
are notional numbers. A more extensive study of how a person becomes “infected” by
terrorist ideology and a development of more rigorous numbers would be needed to
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develop models to rely on and predict with. However, the notional numbers can give a
sense of what the epidemic may look like when modeled mathematically.
ds
= −β is
dt

s(0) = s0 ≥ 0

di
= β is− γ i
dt

i(0) = i0 ≥ 0

dr
=γi
dt

r(0) = r0 ≥ 0

i(t)

s(t)

Figure 24: Terrorism SIR epidemic phase plane—s(t) vs. i(t)
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s(t)
i(t)

r(t)

time
Figure 25: Terrorism SIR epidemic model over time

We can see that these assumptions leave us with a fairly steep epidemic curve,
showing that the susceptible proportion of the population decreases rapidly and the
infected portion peaks around five time periods, after which it slowly decreases.
Modeling without birth and death rates, if we continued to model through time, the
infected proportion should be expected to converge to zero eventually. This is, however,
a simplistic representation of the population susceptible to terrorism. The problem of
terrorism is not a short-term epidemic that can be expected to fade out, as experience has
shown us over time, and thus modeling it as solely an epidemic, without accounting for
the new people who will enter the system (and leave it), leaves an unrealistic picture of
the problem at large. Our initial curves are most likely near correct, but when the rates of
incoming and outgoing members of the system are added, the system will stabilize
differently than an epidemic model would suggest, given its simplified assumptions.
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3.2 The endemic SIR model of terrorism

An endemic model applied to terrorism gives us a longer time-scale look at what
levels of infection are likely to become constant for the epidemic of terrorism. Assuming
the rates that were used in the previous section, and adding μ = 1/40 time periods (20
years), the equations below are used to model the epidemic. Since the population consists
of a specific demographic group, we will consider the “lifespan” of a typical individual
within the population to be 20 years, and use that number for 1/μ in the endemic version
of the SIR model. The differential equations and rates below set up the endemic model of
terrorist ideology.
ds
= μ − μ s− β is
dt

s(0) = s0 ≥ 0

di
= β is− (γ + μ)i
dt

i(0) = i0 ≥ 0

dr
= γ i− μ r
dt

r(0) = r0 ≥ 0

Table 11: Notional rates for endemic terrorism model

Time unit

6 months

β

2 per time unit on average

1/ γ

10 time units (5 years) on average

1/μ

40 time units (20 years)

σ

16 over the average “lifespan”
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Since the model is exactly the same, except for the addition of rates into and out
of the system, the model should look very similar to the epidemic model developed in the
previous section. However, because this is an endemic model, it will converge to the
endemic equilibrium of the infection, and will give a sense of what these numbers will
mean in the long term given that rates are close to the notional ones chosen. The endemic
equilibrium will give a sense of steady-state percentages of the population to expect to be
infected with the terrorist ideology. This means that one can guess at levels of willing
participants in terrorist activities, as well as how many people continue to be within the
susceptible population. This model, if given reasonable estimates, could inform decisionmakers about the potential effects of counterterrorism strategies when they encounter
several alternatives.
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i(t)

s(t)endemic phase plane—s(t) vs. i(t)
Figure 26: Terrorism SIR

i(t)

r(t)

s(t)
time
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Figure 27: Terrorism SIR endemic model over time

Using an endemic model shows more dynamics within the system, with the
interesting outcome that the infected population, given these vital dynamics, can be
expected to reach a steady-state distribution (the endemic equilibrium). This does show
that the initial peak of terrorist mindset infection is the greatest; if our assumptions are
reasonable, it would appear that it is likely that within a given population, the susceptible
population will be rapidly exposed. After the initial exposure, the proportions of those
likely to act on the terrorist mentality will decline until terrorists can be expected to make
up only twenty percent or so of the population at any given time. While this is not good
news—one might wish to see a smaller proportion of infected individuals—it does show
that the initial surge of terrorist recruits cannot be something sustained.
Assuming that the first 2.5 years (5 time units) of exposure to terrorist mindsets
have already elapsed, it is conceivable that for any given population of young Muslim
males, the “infected” proportions are already declining, rather than continuing to peak as
some literature suggests.
The benefit of such models is that one can conduct sensitivity analyses with
regards to the targeting of parameters such as forces of infection and immunization,
where even slight perturbations might make a great difference in the behavior of the
model. It will be necessary to study the sociological makeup of the region of interest and
the terrorists operating within that region to come up with numbers that have more
objective value. With a sense of steady-state levels within the population, the next
challenge is to model the system partitioned into its various component populations, so
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that more complex interactions and dynamics within the system will become apparent in
the model.

4.3 Two age category model

For this model we subdivide the 15 to 35 age group into two equal portions.
Category 1 will be the 15-25 age group and Category 2 will be 25-35. We will assume
that we have a youth bulge (Urdal, 2004) weighted on the younger side of the spectrum,
and thus our percentages will be skewed accordingly over our 20-year spectrum. We will
assume that a younger person is less able to “infect” an older person, and that an older
person is less likely to become infected from either group. As well, we will assume a
longer time period span for the infection of an older person—if they become convinced
of the validity of their cause, they will be less likely to change their minds again later.
The differential equations below and the rates in Table 12 set up the age category
model for the epidemic of terrorist ideology.
d s1
= (c1 + d1 )P1 − [ λ1 + c1 + d1]s1
dt
d i1
= λ1 s1 − [γ1 + c1 + d1 ]i1
dt
d r1
= γ1 i1 − [c1 + d1 ]r1
dt
d s2
= c1 s1 − [ λ2 + c 2 + d2 ]s2
dt
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d i2
= c1 i1 + λ2 s 2 − [γ 2 + c 2 + d2 ]i2
dt
d r2
= c1 r1 + γ 2 i2 − [c 2 + d2 ]r2
dt

Table 12: Age category rates for terrorism SIR model

P1 = 0.7

P2 = 0.3

β11 = 1

β12 = 3

β 21 = 0.1

β 22 = 0.5

d1 =

1
200

c1 =

1
20

γ1 =

d2 =
c2 =

1
8

1
100

c1 P1
8
− d2 =
P2
75

γ2 =

85

1
14

1

0.8

0.6

i(t)
0.4

0.2

0.2

s(t)

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Figure 28: Two age category terrorism SIR model phase plane
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Figure 29: Two age category terrorism SIR model over time
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60

Figure 28 and Figure 29 show the shape of the model when the rates from Table
12 are used within the partitioned model. The entire population is accounted for in these
figures, and it is evident that the model looks different than the endemic model. Adding
the complexity of interactions within states makes the model look different than the
endemic model developed in the section before. Each age category, as well, looks
different when it is modeled separately, as one can see in the figures below. Since these
are modeled as proportions of the total population, the partitioned models have different
ranges for the values within the graphs.
The younger age group, modeled this way, will have a higher steady-state
incidence of both susceptible and infectious populations. The older group will have a
much lower incidence of both, a fact that can be clearly seen as its levels over time are
shown in Figure 33.
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Figure 30: Age category 1 phase plane
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Figure 31: Age category 1 over time
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Figure 33: Age category 2 over time
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From these notional numbers, one can see that our assumptions have changed the
SIR model. The total population stabilizes to an endemic equilibrium that is very close to
the numbers we achieved with the simpler endemic model. However, when one looks at
the model by category, two very different dynamics can be observed. It is evident that a
smaller chance of infection (β value) will curtail the effects of the epidemic to a large
degree, though in this case the long period of infectiousness (γ value) still creates the
peak of infectious population that is associated with an epidemic.

4.4 Terrorism model partitioned by influence, including “immunity”

Using the methodology developed for influence category models, we again
partition the population, this time into category 1, normal, and category 2, highly
influential, individuals. The second category could be thought of as people who have a
large degree of connections to others, unusual persuasiveness, or merely those who can
effectively use the media to gain the sufficient amount of exposure to “infect” or
“immunize” their audience. An imam in a large mosque might be one such person, or the
leader of a terrorist network who produces tapes that are distributed to local television
networks. While this is only based on two categories of people, an argument could be
made for having more partitions, based on local influence.
While the first category is overwhelmingly the largest, the second category has
such a large ability to persuade others that it makes its mark even though it has small
numbers. We also assume that those with an extremist viewpoint will have more
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likelihood of “infecting” people than those with a more moderate viewpoint have to
“immunize” people. We base this assumption on the observation that the current state of
the Islamic world seems to favor apocalyptic paradigms, and most moderate
interpretations of Islam tend to be less apocalyptic in character than are the
fundamentalist or extremist versions.
The differential equations below and the rates in Table 13 set up the influence
category with immunity model of the terrorist epidemic.
d s1
= (c1 + d1 )P1 − [ λ1 + κ1 + c1 + d1]s1
dt
d i1
= λ1 s1 − [γ1 + c1 + d1 ]i1
dt
d r1
= κ1 s1+ γ1 i1 − [c1 + d1 ]r1
dt
d s2
= c1 s1 − [ λ2 + κ 2 + c 2 + d2 ]s2
dt
d i2
= c1 i1 + λ2 s 2 − [γ 2 + c 2 + d2 ]i2
dt
d r2
= c1 r1 + κ 2 s2 + γ 2 i2 − [c 2 + d2 ]r2
dt

Remember that λ and κ are defined as follows:

λ1 = β11 i1 + β12 i 2

λ2 = β 21 i1 + β 22 i 2

κ1 = (α11 r1 + α12 r2 ) s1

κ 2 = (α 21 r1 + α 22 r2 ) s 2
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Table 13: Terrorism influence category model with "immunity" rates

P1 = 0.99

P2 = 0.01

β11 = 1

β12 = 200

β 21 = 1

β 22 = 50

α11 = 1

α12 = 75

α 21 = 1

α 22 = 25

d1 =

1
100

c1 =

1
200

γ1 =

d2 =
c2 =

1
10

c1 P1
97
− d2 =
P2
200

γ2 =
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1
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1

0.8
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Figure 34: Terrorism influence model with "immunity" phase plane
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Figure 35: Terrorism influence category model with "immunity" over time
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In this model, the breakdown diagrams do not differ significantly in shape from
the diagrams for the entire population, so they have been omitted.
The first item of note in this model is that the overall shape of the diagrams is
very similar to that of the endemic model produced earlier. The difference we can see
here is that the endemic model found a steady-state distribution with proportions of the
population in a fixed ratio to one another, while this model shows an eventual trend of
susceptible and infected populations down to zero, or very close. In one sense, this model
incorporates a time limit into the epidemic, because if one assumes that any recovered
individual will have the possibility of having an immunizing effect on susceptible
individuals, the gradual trend toward a larger and larger recovered class (recovery is,
after all, an absorbing state) will create its own epidemic of ideas. This secondary
epidemic of ideas—but ideas that are not considered dangerous to the Western world—
can be thought of as the eventual replacement for the dangerous infection of terrorist
ideology.
In a sense, then, introducing a counter-paradigm to that of the terrorism
propagators would be an eradication strategy. Just as biological epidemics have been
eradicated by strategies created by the world health community (Dowdle, 1999: 23), it
stands to reason that a social epidemic of extremist ideology could be eliminated by an
eradication strategy. Of course, the stakes are high, and finding an “inoculation” that has
a high probability to take hold would be difficult. Typical information operations and
psychological operations that focus on promoting West-friendly ideas might never
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achieve the “stickiness” needed to combat the much more tempting extremist ideology.
(Mazarr, 2004)
One can see from these models, however, that extremist ideology, like any
contagion, could hold within itself the seeds of its own destruction, were the right
approach toward eliminating it employed. The key to eliminating the steady-state levels
of terrorists or, in our models, “infectious” individuals is to introduce a counter-epidemic
of ideas that has a similar ability to propagate within the Muslim world. With such a
strategy, the problematic epidemic of terrorist ideology might come to an end within a
reasonable timeframe.

4.5 Additional applications of a partitioned model

A partitioned model could also be used to show the epidemic as it affects multiple
populations over multiple time periods (Zaric, 2002) In this case the interactions are more
complex, because flows between the partitions of the population are rarely going to be in
one direction only. This will require another set of rates for interactions between
populations. Additionally, all of these ideas could be used together to create a more
complex problem. However, the more factors that are included into the model, the more
difficult the solution becomes.
SIR models have been used to define the boundaries of the feasible region for
problems relating to epidemic control. When this has been done, one can start using the
feasible solutions to an epidemic distribution to develop different controls over
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epidemics. Some of these are resource allocation problems and some discuss
minimization of new infections over a time horizon. With an understanding of the factors
involved in the modeling of epidemics, operations research analysts could apply this sort
of thinking to a model of the spread of terrorist ideology and potentially work out a
strategy to limit and even to eradicate the ideology of terrorism.

4.6 Eradication strategies applied to the epidemic of terrorist ideology

As one considers the spread of the ideology of terrorism, it becomes apparent that
this infection of ideas spreads like a biological epidemic. With that in mind, the strategies
that have been used to eradicate infectious diseases take on new meaning. If
immunization has a counterpart in the realm of ideas, it is likely the propagation of an
alternate mindset from that which backs terrorism, something that is not necessarily proWestern, but is also not virulently anti-Western in nature. In short, the West needs to seek
an alternate epidemic of ideas for the Islamic world that the people in the Western world
can live with. This is not just a marketing scheme, however.
The idea of mass-marketing a particular idea, or new epidemic, is an equivalent to
the mass immunization strategy. Both require a good budget, extensive research and
understanding of the markets into which they wish to inject their message, and adaptation
and creativity to keep up with the easily-bored audience of the message in question.
Because of these needs, a mass-marketing approach is probably not an optimal strategy to
contain the epidemic of terrorism.
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Ring immunization, though, has a promising correlation to the epidemic of ideas.
It would require careful surveillance of the areas in question, however, to be workable.
Any sign of “infection,” such as a person caught participating in terrorist activities, and
the social network surrounding that person should immediately be explored for signs of
infection. Law enforcement agencies likely already do this—albeit unofficially—as they
track down the terrorist cells that have perpetrated acts of terrorism. There could be a
careful inspection of the first-degree associates of the infected person, and then an
alternate idea, tailored to the local culture, could be introduced into that group. Seconddegree associates should be carefully surveyed and tracked for signs of infection, and
treated accordingly.
Ring immunization, or its ideational equivalent, has the potential to be tailored to
the local conditions that surround outbreaks of terrorist ideology. Because the Islamic
world contains such a wide variety of subcultures, this would give any eradication
strategy a greater ability to adapt to each subculture and region. The epidemic of terrorist
ideology could be slowed down in this manner and eventually stopped, if the program
were carefully applied.

4.7 Summary

Looking at terrorist ideology as an epidemic makes it possible to apply the models
used by epidemiologists. SIR models are good descriptors of epidemics, and can be
changed in order to increase complexity and show more interactions that exist within
97

populations in question. With notional rates, these models show the sorts of things to look
at and where the target populations might be for any eventual eradication strategy.
Just as eradication strategies apply to biological epidemics, they have correlates
when it comes to ideational epidemics. In this sense, a mass-marketing campaign could
be considered to be like a mass immunization program. Accordingly, a more targeted and
surveillance-rich ring immunization strategy would be similar to a program that followed
the social networks of known terrorists and tailored “immunization” ideas to the
surrounding networks of people. Modeling and eradication of the social epidemic of
terrorism may be a far-reaching goal, but it provides a fresh paradigm for the study of
how to fight against the spread of terrorism.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Summary

People who wish to solve problems associated with the spread of terrorist
ideology have taken many different approaches to their solutions. Within Western
culture, it is a common assumption that the struggle against terrorists is a war similar to
wars that have been fought against other ideologies. This assumption creates a problem,
however, because the cultural barriers between radical Islamists and Westerners are great.
Rather than modeling problems associated with the War on Terror in a way that
incorporates Western expectations about the nature of war and conflict, it would make
more sense to see the spread of extremist Islamic ideology as an epidemic of ideas.
With this core idea in mind, this thesis has explored the methodologies associated
with epidemiology. Particularly, it has focused on the mathematical models used by
epidemiologists to model the spread of epidemics. Using different variants of the basic
deterministic mathematical model in epidemiology, the SIR model, it has shown the way
that different factors that influence the spread of epidemics change the way that an
epidemic can be modeled. From short-term and simple in the SIR epidemic model to
complex partitioned models that show interactions between age groups or influence
categories, this paper looks through the types of models one can develop to understand
the dynamics of an epidemic. Additionally, epidemic eradication strategies are considered
and described, along with when and where they would work best.
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From there the thesis continues on to apply the models developed to the specific
problem of the epidemic of terrorist ideology. Each type of model from the simple to the
complex is considered, and applied with notional initial rates. From there, it discusses the
application of different eradication strategies to the epidemic of terrorist ideology. While
a mass-marketing strategy might be the most obvious approach, a targeted ring strategy
with adaptability to local subcultures might have a greater effect. While no strategy will
immediately end the spread of terrorist ideology, either of these could eventually end the
epidemic.
This is a first look at how to approach the question of terrorism and the fight
against it from another angle. Since almost all of the problem-solving models that have
been developed to fight terrorism incorporate ideas about the struggle being a war of
sorts, this is a new set of assumptions to use to base models on. Instead of talking about
target value, risk assessment, and resource allocation, it might be better to think about
eradication strategies, control measures, and threshold numbers. Since the current
paradigms that back studies of counterterrorism seem to be breaking down, this new
approach might be of value as another perspective on the fight.

5.2 Recommendations

5.2.1 Populating SIR models with demographic data
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There are an abundance of possible future directions for research into the
application of epidemiology to the study of terrorism. Even the models presented within
this paper need to be populated with demographic data. The rates of infection, recovery,
contact rates, and sufficient exposure would need to be collected from intelligence or
surveys done in the region of interest by social scientists. Demographic data about the
regions of interest and data about the sociopolitical structure of these regions should be
studied and applied where necessary. An abundance of data exists; it would take looking
into which studies are applicable and how the studies could be quantified into meaningful
numbers for epidemiological models.

5.2.2 Other epidemiological models

SIR models are not the extent of models of epidemics that exist within the realm
of epidemiology. Indeed, this overview barely scratches the surface of the models
available. It is intended to be an example of how the tools of epidemiologists could be
used to study and understand terrorism. Another type of epidemiological models that
would be of interest are geographical models that show the spread of an infection
throughout a region with contour plots for each time period. These have been used with
biological epidemics to track the source of an infection, and might have a parallel use for
ideational epidemics. Used over a “landscape” of social networks, this might clarify the
source nodes for an infection and perhaps offer insight into where future infections might
develop.
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Even the compartmentalized model could be developed further, so that instead of
a basic SIR model, some vertical transmission of immunity (the category M) is
incorporated into the model. This would model the influence that parents would have
over their offspring. Additionally, a latent period, where an individual may be infected
but is not yet infectious (the category E) could shed light on the model.

5.2.3 Using other applications of epidemiology

The applications of epidemiology that have been developed by marketers should
be studied. “Viral marketing” might well be incorporated in the eventual eradication
strategy applied to the spread of extremist Islamist ideology. Marketers have spent more
time studying ideational epidemics than any other group of people, and thus their
methods and findings about epidemics of ideas are the best source of data and strategies
for someone who would seek to apply the idea to another discipline. While the study of
counterterrorism must be kept distinct from trend research, there are some valid
correspondences between these disciplines as well.

5.2.4 Using SIR models for optimization

Some applications of SIR models of biological epidemics include using the model
as a definition of the feasible region within which to optimize some function of the
variables in the system. For instance, one paper optimizes resource allocation by showing
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the effects that several control measures would have on a SIR model and using a function
of the infected population as the objective value function. One seeks to minimize the
numbers of infected within the model by applying the control measures that are
constrained by budgetary requirements. (Zaric and Brandeau, 2002) Similarly, one could
model different eradication strategies and their perceived effects, and optimize using the
SIR model to show what the effects might be. The SIR model is a different conception of
the shape of terrorism within a region, and may have some applicability as a background
for other often-used methods of problem-solving. The idea that terrorism could be
conceived of as an epidemic of ideas crosses disciplinary boundaries and will require
some synthesis of disciplines and approaches in order to be well applied, but it carries
with it enormous promise as well.

5.3 Conclusion

Reassessing our assumptions about terrorism and how to fight it has the potential
to change all of the approaches to fighting terrorists. Since the United States is now
engaged in a War on Terror, this is a good avenue to explore. It is evident that, while
some of the strategies of warfare that have been used to fight the war on terrorism are
effective, many are not, and the struggle continues to become increasingly more bogged
down. The military is notorious for “fighting the last war,” because that is the war that we
understand, but paradigms from the Cold War break down when applied to the struggle
against extremist Islamist ideologies. If we consider terrorism the symptom of a disease,
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and model that disease as we would an epidemic, it might well cast light on the problems
with the current state of affairs and highlight better courses of action for the future. A
new perspective on an ongoing problem cannot be a detriment to understanding that
problem.
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Appendix: Mathematica 5.2 Code for SIR plots
(*This plots the phase plane: i(t) against s(t) for the epidemic SIR model*)
beta=2.25; gamma=1.5;
p0=Plot[1-x,{x,0,1},DisplayFunction→Identity];
sols={};
plots={p0};
For[k=1,k<20,
sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t],i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t], s[0] 10.05*k,i[0] 0.05*k},{s,i},{t,0,50}]];
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s[t],i[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,50},DisplayFunction→Identity]]
;
k++];
For[k=20,k<40,
sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t],i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t], s[0] 0.51+(k20)*0.025,i[0] 0.01},{s,i},{t,0,50}]];
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s[t],i[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,50},DisplayFunction→Identity]]
;
k++];
Show[plots,AspectRatio→1,PlotRange→{{0,1},{0,1}},DisplayFunction→$DisplayFunction]
Clear[solution]
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(*This plots the endemic phase plane*)
beta=21/20; gamma=1/3; mu = 1/60;
p0=Plot[1-x,{x,0,1},DisplayFunction→Identity];
sols={};
plots={p0};
For[k=1,k<20,
sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t]+mu-mu*s[t],i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t]mu*i[t], s[0] 1-0.05*k,i[0] 0.05*k},{s,i},{t,0,200}]];
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s[t],i[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunction→Identity]
];
k++];
For[k=20,k<40,
sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t]+mu-mu*s[t],i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t]mu*i[t], s[0] 0.51+(k-20)*0.025,i[0] 0.01},{s,i},{t,0,100}]];
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s[t],i[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,100},DisplayFunction→Identity]
];
k++];
Show[plots,AspectRatio→1,PlotRange→{{0,1},{0,1}},DisplayFunction→$DisplayFunction]
Clear[solution]
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Graphics
(*This plots s[t], i[t] and r[t] over time for the epidemic SIR model*)
beta=2.25; gamma=1.5;
NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t], i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t], s[0] .99, i[0] .01}, {s,i},
{t,0,25}]
Plot[Evaluate[{s[t], i[t], 1-(s[t]+ i[t])}/.%],{t,0,25}, PlotRange→{{0,25},{0,1}}]
{{s→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,25.}},<>],i→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,25.}},<>]}}
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Graphics
(*This plots s[t], i[t] and r[t] over time for the endemic SIR model*)
beta=21/20; gamma=1/3; mu = 1/60;
NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t]+mu-mu*s[t], i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t]-mu*i[t], s[0] .99,
i[0] .01}, {s,i}, {t,0,120}]
Plot[Evaluate[{s[t], i[t], 1-(s[t]+ i[t])}/.%],{t,0,120}, PlotRange→{{0,120},{0,1}}]
{{s→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,120.}},<>],i→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,120.}},<>]}}
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Graphics
(*This plots the two age group SIR model phase plane: s1[t]+s2[t] vs. i1[t]+i2[t]*)
beta11=1;beta12=3;beta21=0.1;beta22=0.5; gamma1=1/8;gamma2=1/14; d1=
1/200;d2=1/100;c1=1/20;c2=8/75;P1=.7;P2=.3;
p0=Plot[1-x,{x,0,1},DisplayFunction→Identity];
sols={};
plots={p0};
For[k=1,k<20,
sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t]-(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t](c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P10.05*P1*k,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2*k,i1[0] 0.05*P1*k,i2[0] 0.05*P2*k},{s1,s2,i1,i2},{t,0,200}]];
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s1[t]+s2[t],i1[t]+i2[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunc
tion→Identity]];
k++];
Show[plots,AspectRatio→1,PlotRange→{{0,1},{0,1}},DisplayFunction→$DisplayFunction]
Clear[sols]
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(*This plots the two age group SIR model phase plane: s1[t] vs. i1[t]*)
beta11=1;beta12=3;beta21=0.1;beta22=0.5; gamma1=1/8;gamma2=1/14; d1=
1/200;d2=1/100;c1=1/20;c2=8/75;P1=.7;P2=.3;
p0=Plot[P1-x,{x,0,P1},DisplayFunction→Identity];
sols={};
plots={p0};
For[k=1,k<20,
sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t]-(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t](c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-
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(gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P10.05*P1*k,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2*k,i1[0] 0.05*P1*k,i2[0] 0.05*P2*k},{s1,s2,i1,i2},{t,0,200}]];
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s1[t],i1[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunction→Identit
y]];
k++];
Show[plots,AspectRatio→1,PlotRange→{{0,P1},{0,P1}},DisplayFunction→$DisplayFunction]
Clear[sols]
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Graphics
(*This plots the two age group SIR model phase plane: s2[t] vs. i2[t]*)
beta11=1;beta12=3;beta21=0.1;beta22=0.5; gamma1=1/8;gamma2=1/14; d1=
1/200;d2=1/100;c1=1/20;c2=8/75;P1=.7;P2=.3;
p0=Plot[P2-x,{x,0,P2},DisplayFunction→Identity];
sols={};
plots={p0};
For[k=1,k<20,
sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t]-(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t](c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P10.05*P1*k,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2*k,i1[0] 0.05*P1*k,i2[0] 0.05*P2*k},{s1,s2,i1,i2},{t,0,200}]];
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s2[t],i2[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunction→Identit
y]];
k++];
Show[plots,AspectRatio→1,PlotRange→{{0,P2},{0,P2}},DisplayFunction→$DisplayFunction]
Clear[sols]
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(*This plots s[t], i[t] and r[t] over time for the age category SIR model*)
beta11=1;beta12=3;beta21=0.1;beta22=0.5; gamma1=1/8;gamma2=1/14; d1=
1/200;d2=1/100;c1=1/20;c2=8/75;P1=.7;P2=.3;
NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-(c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t](beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P10.05*P1,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2,i1[0] 0.05*P1,i2[0] 0.05*P2}, {s1,s2,i1,i2}, {t,0,150}]
Plot[Evaluate[{s1[t]+s2[t],i1[t]+i2[t], 1-(s1[t]+s2[t]+i1[t]+i2[t])}/.%],{t,0,60},
PlotRange→{{0,60},{0,1}}]
{{s1→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],s2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i1→InterpolatingFu
nction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>]}}
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Graphics
(*This plots s1[t], i1[t] and r1[t] over time for the age category SIR model*)
beta11=1;beta12=3;beta21=0.1;beta22=0.5; gamma1=1/8;gamma2=1/14; d1=
1/200;d2=1/100;c1=1/20;c2=8/75;P1=.7;P2=.3;
NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-(c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t](beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P10.05*P1,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2,i1[0] 0.05*P1,i2[0] 0.05*P2}, {s1,s2,i1,i2}, {t,0,150}]
Plot[Evaluate[{s1[t],i1[t], P1-(s1[t]+i1[t])}/.%],{t,0,60}, PlotRange→{{0,60},{0,P1}}]
{{s1→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],s2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i1→InterpolatingFu
nction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>]}}
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(*This plots s2[t], i2[t] and r2[t] over time for the age category SIR model*)
beta11=1;beta12=3;beta21=0.1;beta22=0.5; gamma1=1/8;gamma2=1/14; d1=
1/200;d2=1/100;c1=1/20;c2=8/75;P1=.7;P2=.3;
NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-(c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t](beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P10.05*P1,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2,i1[0] 0.05*P1,i2[0] 0.05*P2}, {s1,s2,i1,i2}, {t,0,150}]
Plot[Evaluate[{s2[t],i2[t], P2-(s2[t]+i2[t])}/.%],{t,0,60}, PlotRange→{{0,60},{0,P2}}]
{{s1→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],s2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i1→InterpolatingFu
nction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>]}}
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(*This plots the two influence groups SIR model phase plane with immunization: s1[t]+s2[t] vs.
i1[t]+i2[t]*)
beta11=.75;beta12=100;beta21=0.2;beta22=25;alpha11=.5;alpha12=75;alpha21=.1;alpha22=20;
gamma1=1/3;gamma2=1/2; d1= 1/100;d2=1/100;c1=1/20;c2=247/50;P1=.99;P2=.01;
p0=Plot[1-x,{x,0,1},DisplayFunction→Identity];
sols={};
plots={p0};
For[k=1,k<20,
sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-(alpha11*(P1-s1[t]i1[t])+alpha12*(P2-s2[t]-i2[t]))*s1[t]-(c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t](beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(alpha21*(P1-s1[t]-i1[t])+alpha22*(P2-s2[t]-i2[t]))*s2[t](c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P10.05*P1*k,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2*k,i1[0] 0.05*P1*k,i2[0] 0.05*P2*k},{s1,s2,i1,i2},{t,0,200}]];
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s1[t]+s2[t],i1[t]+i2[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunc
tion→Identity]];
k++];
Show[plots,AspectRatio→1,PlotRange→{{0,1},{0,1}},DisplayFunction→$DisplayFunction]
Clear[sols]
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(*This plots s[t], i[t] and r[t] over time for the influence category SIR model with immunization*)
beta11=.75;beta12=100;beta21=0.2;beta22=25;alpha11=.5;alpha12=75;alpha21=.1;alpha22=20;
gamma1=1/3;gamma2=1/2; d1= 1/100;d2=1/100;c1=1/20;c2=247/50;P1=.99;P2=.01;
NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-(alpha11*(P1-s1[t]-i1[t])+alpha12*(P2s2[t]-i2[t]))*s1[t]-(c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t]-(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(alpha21*(P1s1[t]-i1[t])+alpha22*(P2-s2[t]-i2[t]))*s2[t]-(c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P10.05*P1,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2,i1[0] 0.05*P1,i2[0] 0.05*P2}, {s1,s2,i1,i2}, {t,0,150}]
Plot[Evaluate[{s1[t]+s2[t],i1[t]+i2[t], 1-(s1[t]+s2[t]+i1[t]+i2[t])}/.%],{t,0,60},
PlotRange→{{0,60},{0,1}}]
{{s1→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],s2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i1→InterpolatingFu
nction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>]}}
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(*This plots the two influence groups SIR model phase plane with immunization: s2[t] vs. i2[t]*)

beta11=.75;beta12=100;beta21=0.2;beta22=25;alpha11=.5;alpha12=75;alpha21=.1;alpha22=20;
gamma1=1/3;gamma2=1/2; d1= 1/100;d2=1/100;c1=1/20;c2=247/50;P1=.99;P2=.01;
p0=Plot[P2-x,{x,0,P2},DisplayFunction→Identity];
sols={};
plots={p0};
For[k=1,k<20,
sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-(alpha11*(P1-s1[t]i1[t])+alpha12*(P2-s2[t]-i2[t]))*s1[t]-(c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t](beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(alpha21*(P1-s1[t]-i1[t])+alpha22*(P2-s2[t]-i2[t]))*s2[t](c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P10.05*P1*k,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2*k,i1[0] 0.05*P1*k,i2[0] 0.05*P2*k},{s1,s2,i1,i2},{t,0,200}]];
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s2[t],i2[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunction→Identit
y]];
k++];
Show[plots,AspectRatio→1,PlotRange→{{0,P2},{0,P2}},DisplayFunction→$DisplayFunction]
Clear[sols]
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(*This plots s2[t], i2[t] and r2[t] over time for the influence category SIR model with
immunization*)
beta11=.75;beta12=100;beta21=0.2;beta22=25;alpha11=.5;alpha12=75;alpha21=.1;alpha22=20;
gamma1=1/3;gamma2=1/2; d1= 1/100;d2=1/100;c1=1/20;c2=247/50;P1=.99;P2=.01;
NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-(alpha11*(P1-s1[t]-i1[t])+alpha12*(P2s2[t]-i2[t]))*s1[t]-(c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t]-(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(alpha21*(P1s1[t]-i1[t])+alpha22*(P2-s2[t]-i2[t]))*s2[t]-(c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t](gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P10.05*P1,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2,i1[0] 0.05*P1,i2[0] 0.05*P2}, {s1,s2,i1,i2}, {t,0,150}]
Plot[Evaluate[{s2[t],i2[t], P2-(s2[t]+i2[t])}/.%],{t,0,60}, PlotRange→{{0,60},{0,P2}}]
{{s1→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],s2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i1→InterpolatingFu
nction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>]}}
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